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COMMENTARY

THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL LEGAL
SCHOLARSHIPt
Ronald K.L. Collins*
& David M. Skover**

Earl Warren is dead.
A generation of liberal legal scholars continues, nevertheless, to act
as if the man and his Court preside over the present. While this romanticism is understandable, it exacts a high price in a world
transformed.
The following commentary is a reconstructive criticism 1 written
from the perspective of two liberals2 concerned about the future of
"legal liberalism." We present our views as a commentary to emphasize their preliminary character; they represent our current assessment
of where liberals stand and where they might redirect their energies.
In Part I, we outline the reasons for believing that there is cause
for alarm, though not resignation, in the liberal legal community. We
also define the contours of what we mean by "liberal legal scholarship." In Part II, we discuss how conservatives have managed, with
varying degrees of success, to frame the nature of public law discourse
in the 1980s, and how liberals have reacted, and are likely to continue
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1. We use the expressions "reconstructive criticism" or "reconstructive thought" to emphasize that, although we may be critical from within by reevaluating liberal legal theory and politics, we are not critics from without, abdicating either responsibility or efforts to redirect legal
liberalism.
·
2. We mention this in order to acquaint the reader with the general perspective from which
we view social reality and the legal order, open-minded as we strive to be. In Part I of this
commentary, we set out some definitional guidelines as to our meaning of "liberal." In a more
quixotic sense, our liberalism consists of an abiding commitment to certain values. See J.
STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 462-63 (1939).

189

190

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:189

to react, to this phenomenon. We then describe what we believe to be
the pitfalls of such "reactive" scholarship.
In order to suggest some broad avenues for future liberal scholarship, we offer in Part III a historical account of the approaches taken
by liberal scholars to meet the challenges of conservatism in law and
politics during the period from 1876 to 1937. While the parallels between that era and our own are, of course, not exact, the lessons of
that period do offer a wealth of experience and thought upon which
liberals may draw. Finally, in Part IV, we examine three avenues that
may be available, among others, for intellectually powerful and politically effective liberal legal scholarship. In doing so, we analyze inherent shortcomings of liberal iegal theory, and suggest that future
liberals reevaluate their commitment to current individual rights
consciousness.
It is not our purpose to develop any full-blown constitutional theory. Rather, we aim to critique predominant intellectual problems in
liberal legal theory, thereby identifying the constructs that liberal
scholars must alter or abandon; to suggest the general contours within
which a new liberal scholarship, however defined, might operate; and,
finally, to introduce, by way of illustration, some possible alternative
avenues for liberal legal scholarship. 3 Alternatively, at the least, we
hope that our comments will spark debate and discussion among liberal scholars.
3. A charge may be leveled against our supposition that liberal legal scholarship is, or should
be, cognizant of politics. Critics could be troubled by what they see as result-oriented argumentation that is not value neutral. ("We are,'' so the argument goes, "legal scholars, not mere
political tacticians or moral philosophers.")
To this charge, we offer two responses and a question. First, this charge obviously has no
bearing on the policy reform work of legal scholars directed to lawmakers and law enforcers
rather than to courts. Similarly, it has little or no bearing on what lawmakers and executive
officers should do to confine governmental action within constitutional bounds. In fact, the
charge may be faulted for its obsession with judicial review: "Because constitutional scholarship
has remained consistently preoccupied with the institutional concerns of the judicial process, it
sees constitutional law as composed of questions about what judges should do, not what government should do." Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227, 251
(1972).
Second, the avenues for future liberal scholarship introduced in Part IV are essentially consistent with the premise of the charge that scholars should not transform judicial decisionmaking
into judicial statecraft. To the extent that liberal scholars pursue broad socioeconomic reforms,
we recognize the importance of directing these efforts to the federal and state political branches.
These preliminary responses should suffice. In keeping with the theme of the charge, we call
on the critics to answer the following: Can any legal scholar who asserts any allegiance to liberalism tolerate a vision of the Constitution which extols Plessy v. Ferguson and deprecates Brown
v. Board ofEducation? In other words, isn't there some limit to value neutrality in the enterprise
of a liberal legal scholar?
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SE'ITING THE SCENARIO

How will liberal legal scholars respond to the new realities of the .
next decade and the twenty-first century?
This question arises against a menacing backdrop. Conservatives
have won the lion's share of presidential contests since 1970. There
has not been a Democratic appointment to the Supreme Court in over
two decades. The egalitarian revolution of the Warren Court is slowly
winding down. Moreover, since 1980, the Department of Justice, the
Legal Services Corporation,4 the Civil Rights Commission, 5 federal
regulatory agencies, 6 and even the Commission on the Bicentennial of
the U.S. Constitution7 have distanced themselves from the post-war
liberal agenda.
Meanwhile, Ronald Reagan has created an enduring institutional
legacy. s In fewer than eight years, he has reshaped the federal bench,
both in numbers and in judicial philosophy. Reagan has named more
judges of lower federal courts - some 398 in all9 - than Franklin D.
Roosevelt did in 12 years with 203 judges. More than 48% of the
sitting federal judges are Reagan appointees. Io Reagan judges command a majority in all but four of the twelve federal courts of appeals. I I They predominate in the influential Courts of Appeals for the
4. See Coyle, The Social Agenda Hits a Brick Wall, Natl. L.J., Apr. 18, 1988, at 24 (in spite
of Reagan administration attempts, Legal Services Corporation (LSC) not abolished, but its
funding drastically reduced); Ponce, Lawmakers Claim Legal Services Chairman Misused Funds,
Wash. Times, July 11, 1988, at AS, col. 1; Marcus, Legal Services Corp. Drops Advisers, Wash.
Post, Apr. 23, 1988, at All, col. 1 (LSC hired lawyers to "advise it in its attempt to persuade
Congress to cut its budget.").
5. See, e.g., Mehler, Rightist on the Rights Panel, NATION, May 7, 1988, at 640, 642 (Commissioner Mary Frances Berry said, "[The Civil Rights Commission] has become dangerous to
anyone who is interested in furthering civil rights."); Berry, Taming the Civil Rights Commission,
NATION, Feb. 2, 1985, at 106.
6. See Regulation: Fragile Change at Best, Natl. L.J., Apr. 18, 1988, at 26. A notable exception is Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, who admirably guided public policy affecting vital
health issues.
7. See Kitman & Yodaiken, Celebrating (Yawn) the Constitution, NATION, July 2/9, 1988, at
1.
8. According to the director of the Center for Judicial Studies, a conservative think tank,
"[t]here is no question that [Reagan's judicial appointments record] is the most lasting and significant achievement of the Reagan administration." Wermiel, Reagan Choices Alter the Makeup &
Views of the Federal Courts, Wall St. J., Feb. l, 1988, at l, col. 1.
9. Telephone interview with Sheila Joy, Staff Assistant to the Deputy Attorney General (July
7, 1988) [hereinafter Joy Interview]. As of the time of this writing, 30 nominees of the 398
named have not yet been confirmed by the Senate, and may not be. See Cunningham, Hanging
Judges, NATL. REV., May 27, 1988, at 40.
10. Joy interview, supra note 9; Reagan Justice, LEGAL TIMES, May/June 1988 (Special Supplement); O'Brien, Reagan's Legacy for U.S. Courts, L.A. Times, Aug. 23, 1987, § 5, at 1, col. 1.
These data were updated by the authors using Wermiel, Full-Court Review of Panel Rulings
Becomes Tool Often Used by Reagan Judges Aiming To Mold Law, Wall St. J., Mar. 22, 1988, at
70, col. 1 [hereinafter Wermiel, Full-Court Review]; Wermiel, supra note 8.
11. See Reagan Justice, supra note 10, at 10-54. As of this writing, the Reagan judges do not
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District of Columbia and Second Circuits. In all of these appointments, the Reagan Justice Department, with former Attorney General
Edwin Meese at the helm, has played a dominant role, ensuring the
selection of candidates who conform to the administration's political
and ideological preferences. 12
The winds of change can already be detected in recent decisions 13
in discrete areas of constitutional law, such as criminal justice, taking,
religious establishment, affirmative action in employment discrimination, privacy, and justiciability doctrines. 14 Specifically, Reagan appointees are only half as likely as appellate judges appointed by
Democratic presidents to rule in favor of civil rights plaintiffs, criminal defendants and public interest groups. 15 And, according to two
new studies by political scientists C.K. Rowland and Robert Carp,
Reagan appointees are already changing the direction of federal law.
constitute a majority of the judges of the Courts of Appeals for the First Circuit (2 of 6), Fifth
Circuit (7 of 14), Ninth Circuit (10 of 25), and Eleventh Circuit (2 of 12).
12. See L.' CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE 133-34 (1987); O'Brien, Judicial Roulette, in RE·
PORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 60-64
(1988).
13. See, e.g., Reagan Justice, supra note 10, at 7, 11, 12, 30, 31, 34, 36, 38, 39, 41 & 42
(noting influence of Reagan judges). But see Coyle, The Judiciary: A Great Right Hope, Natl.
L.J., Apr. 18, 1988, at 22 (conflicting views on conservative impact of Reagan judiciary); Reagan
Justice, supra note 10, at 17, 20, 24, 25, 27, 43, 49 & 52 (noting no significant influence).
14. See, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987) (recognized cause of action for unconstitutional taking in inverse
condemnation); United States v. Salemo, 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987) (sustained pretrial detention
provisions of Bail Reform Act of 1984); Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675
(1986) (limited first amendment protections for public school students); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186 (1986) (no right of privacy for homosexual activity); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ.,
476 U.S. 1014 (1986) (preferential layoff provision of consent decree violated Equal Protection
Clause); United States v. Monsanto, 836 F.2d 74 (2d Cir. 1987) (Mahoney & Cardamone, JJ.)
(seizure of tainted assets of drug and racketeering defendants); Michigan Road Builders Assn. v.
Milliken, 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987) (Krupansky, J.) (invalidated preferences in state contracts
for businesses owned by blacks and women); Chicago Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Chicago, 819 F.2d
732, 741 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner & Easterbrook, JJ., concurring) (while voting to uphold Chicago landlord regulation, criticized it for economic impacts and suggested other legal arguments
to defeat it); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. City of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922
(9th Cir. 1987) (Kozinski, J.) (municipal affirmative action plan for construction contracts invalidated in absence of evidence of past racial discrimination); Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 807 F.2d 1243
(5th Cir. 1987) (Jones & Davis, JJ.) (limited federal court authority to order transfer of mentally
retarded from state schools to community centers); Mozert v. Hawkins County Public Schools,
647 F. Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn. 1986) (Thomas Hull, J.) (right of fundamentalist Christian parents to keep children out of public school reading classes because of objections to textbooks),
revd., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988). The federal appellate
and district court judges who authored the opinions above were appointed by President Reagan.
15. O'Brien, Reagan's Legacy for U.S. Courts, supra note 10, at 3, col. 5; see also Note, All
the President's Men? A Study ofRonald Reagan's Appointments to the U.S. Courts ofAppeals, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 766, 783 (1987). But cf Whitman, Are Reagan's New Judges Really Closet
Moderates?, Wash. Post, Aug. 9, 1987, at Cl, col. 4 (drawing on various cases decided by lower
court federal judges appointed by Reagan).
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For example, data obtained from a 1981 to 1985 study of federal district court decisions reveal the following contrast:

Carter Appointees
Reagan Appointees

Affirming Claims
of Race Bias

Affirming Claims
of Handicap
Bias

59%
13%

61%
25%;16

In the area of criminal justice c~ses decided by federal district courts
between 1981and1984, a Rowland, Carp, and Songer study produced
these findings:
Affirming Criminal Justice
Rights Claims
Nixon Appointees
Carter Appointees
Reagan Appointees

32%
47%
24%.17

Furthermore, the Reagan judiciary apparently discovered a powerful
tool in the en bane review process, which it has employed with increasing frequency to steer federal courts in a more conservative direction.
In the last four years, the number of en bane appellate decisions increased 33%, in contrast to a 5% growth from 1976 through 1983. 18
Predictably, liberal rulings by three-judge panels were often reversed.
Yet more troubling for liberals is the prospect that Chief Justice
William Rehnquist and Justices Byron White, Sandra Day O'Connor,
Antonin Scalia, and Anthony Kennedy will solidify their conservative
phalanx, thereby cementing the retrenchment of individual rights at
the appellate level. There is another scenario that liberal America cannot countenance: the possibility that Justices Brennan, Marshall or
Blackmun might not survive another Republican presidential term.
Even if, after the 1988 elections, the Supreme Court is not dominated by conservative jurists, the conservative victory may still be
largely realized if the Court commits to a policy of marginalizing core
rights-affirming precedents. 19 With such precedents in place, the Rea16. Rowland, Carp & Todd, If Presidents Reagan and Carter Were Judges: The Quantity
and Quality of Support for Civil Rights on the Federal Trial Courts 25 (rev. ed. Mar. 25, 1986)
(unpublished manuscript).
17. Rowland, Songer & Carp, Presidential Effects on Criminal Justice Policy in the Lower
Federal Courts: The Reagan Judges, 22 LAW & Socv. RE.v. 191, 196 (1988).
18. Full-Court Review, supra note 10.
19. Of course, not all factions within the conservative camp will necessarily seek to marginalize the same core rights-affirming precedents.
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gan-dominated lower federal courts would likely continue, or accelerate, their rightward jurisprudential movement.
Any or all of these developments could change the culture of the
law in ways that might fundamentally alter the liberal conception of
constitutional justice. Regrettably, in the face of these and other realities, liberal legal scholarship is largely bereft of new concepts of the
law suitable to the time. It must be emphasized that the real crisis in
liberal scholarship is not caused by the conservative rise in power; nor
will this crisis necessarily be cured by any conservative decline in
power. Rather, it is that the realities of the Reagan regime have accentuated the shortcomings of such scholarship. If legal liberalism is
in jeopardy, as we fear, it is largely because its scholars have not responded in creative and coherent ways to the conditions which have
made its post-FDR/Warren Court agenda nearly obsolete. 2° Functionally, doctrinally, and theoretically, as we describe in Part IV, legal
liberalism may have exhausted itself to the point where the ideas of the
past may prevent the realization of the ideals of the future.
Admittedly, the contemporary concepts of "liberal" and "conservative" scholarship are necessarily inexact. 2 I Within today's liberal
and conservative camps, there are such rifts in beliefs and practices
that any definitions will undoubtedly be inaccurate, insufficiently comprehensive, or overlapping. 22 It is only possible to align legal scholarship in an imprecise manner with ideological and political values,
"interest clusters" that are themselves broadly characterized. No single definition is likely to describe the beliefs of liberal or conservative
20. For an insightful call to liberal law practitioners to set an agenda in a new Republican or
Democratic administration, see LaMarche, An Agenda/or the 1990s, Natl. L.J., June 27, 1988, at
13.
21. This assertion recognizes that the phrase "contemporary liberal legal scholarship" may
not be tied to the political value structures rooted in classical liberal political philosophy. For
accounts of the transformation of the meaning of "liberal" in American political history from the
nineteenth century through the New Deal, see R. MCELVAINE, THE END OF THE CONSERVATIVE ERA: LIBERALISM AFTER REAGAN 40-44 (1987) (with the rise of industrialism, liberals
"underwent a 180-degree turn in their methods," recognizing that great aggregations of capital
posed more immediate threats to the common good than did possible abuses of government
power); A. SCHLESINGER, THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY 232-41 (1986) (liberal case for
affirmative government as an instrument of greater democracy).
22. Consider, for example, that the conservative constitutional law movement includes both
"judicial prudentialists" who promote a limited role for the judiciary in reviewing the constitutionality of the product of the political processes, see, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH 3-4, 9-13 (1962); Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 41
IND. L.J. 1, 2-3, 8 (1971), and the recently emerging school oflibertarian constitutionalism that
promotes judicial activism, or "intervention,'' on behalf of individual economic rights, see, e.g.,
ECONOMIC LIBERTIES AND THE JUDICIARY (J. Dorn & H. Manne eds. 1987); R. EPSTEIN, TAK·
INGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 29-31 (1985); S. MACEDO,
THE NEW RIGHT V. THE CONSTITUTION 35-37, 50-54, 60 (1987); B. SIEGAN, ECONOMIC LIB·
ERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION (1980); Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89
YALE L.J. 472 (1980).
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scholars as a whole, or to be attributable in full to any individual
scholar.
Nevertheless, liberal scholars generally can be distinguished from
their conservative counterparts by certain sociopolitical postures. Today's liberals believe that unfettered economic markets are limited in
their ability to serve the public welfare, and that government must
play an active role in regulating business and in rectifying gross imbalances in economic power and the distribution of wealth. This belief is
in stark contrast to the conservative creed of governmental noninterference in private economic and social choices. Liberals are convinced
that political and social egalitarianism are the instruments of democratic government, and that democratic government must be trusted
as the register of the common good. Thus, although they are not unconcerned with economic liberties, and have promoted protection of
the rights of workers and their opportunities for self-determination,
liberals place their priority on social justice and civil equality, whereas
conservatives place individual economic freedom of business entrepreneurs at the top of their list of concerns. Yet, liberals have never lost
sight of the potential for tyranny in big government; typically, they
have opposed governmental regulation of the "private" realms of
political and personal choice,23 again in contrast to conservatives, who
are generally willing to cede these points to government. 24
So understood, contemporary liberal scholars found political consonance and ideological receptivity in the federal judiciary of the War23. But see Moose Lodge No. 107 v. lrvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972) (Douglas, Marshall & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). On the other hand, liberals have been criticized by the political and scholarly Left for undue attachment to the "public-private" distinction which underlies even this
protection of the private realms. See, e.g., Mensch & Freeman, Liberalism's Public/Private Split,
TIKKUN MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 24.
24. Excellent analyses of the fundamental sociopolitical beliefs and goals of post-New Deal
liberalism, and the contrasting positions of twentieth-century conservatives, are presented in T.
FERGUSON & J. ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE
OF AMERICAN POLITICS 9-11 (1986); M. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM 72-81 (1986) ("pervasive suspicion of corporate
power," "commitment to pragmatic, result-oriented instrumental action," "the best antidote to
big business is big government," "popular accountability"); R. MCELVAINE, supra note 21, at
40-47; A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 21, at 237-40. As Arthur Schlesinger recognizes, the political beliefs of contemporary liberals are rooted in Franklin Roosevelt's agenda which he called
the Economic Bill of Rights:
"The liberal party," FDR had written, "is a party which believes that, as new conditions
and problems arise beyond the power of men and women to meet as individuals, it becomes
the duty of the Government itself to find new remedies with which to meet them. The
liberal party insists that the Government has the definite duty to use all its power and resources to meet new social problems with new social controls - to insure to the average
person the right to his own economic and political life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness."
A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 21, at 240 (quoting 1938 F.D. ROOSEVELT, PUBLIC PAPERS AND
ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT xxix-xxx (1941)).
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ren Court years. In the last four decades, the vast bulk of liberal legal
scholarship may be characterized by "court-positivism,"25 particularly
in the constitutional field. Liberal scholars treated the progressive
constitutional rulings of the federal judiciary as given, needing only to
be identified and explained. They directed their efforts to a dialogue
with the federal judiciary, defending its activist constitutional review
power, and developing its analyses for the protection of civil equality
and substantive individual rights.
Thus the attention that constitutional theorists had given during
the New Deal to the sweeping power of congressional economic regulation26 shifted to the contemporary theorists' obsession with the question of the legitimacy of judicial review. Laurence Tribe's arguments
for substantive due process enforcement of fundamental rights, 27 John
Hart Ely's promotion of process-perfecting and representation-reinforcing review,28 Michael Perry's reliance on conventional morality
for judicial safeguarding of rights, 29 and Neil Komesar's preference for
comparative institutional competence analysis30 all represent a com25. The phrase "court-positivism" is Professor H. Jefferson Powell's, who used it to take
exception to Professor Laurence Tribe for "confining his attention to Supreme Court decisions,
law review articles, and occasional actions by the other branches of the federal government" and
"treat[ing] the Court's decisions as a given, to be explained, manipulated, and systematized, but
criticized only within narrow limits." Powell, Reaching the Limits of Traditional Constitutional
Scholarship (Book Review), 80 Nw. U. L. R.E.v. 1128, 1136 (1986) (reviewing L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1985)).
In his studies of public law scholarship, both constitutional and nonconstitutional, from the
1930s through the 1980s, Professor Mark Tushnet concludes that most American legal scholars
during this period engaged in relatively traditional doctrinal analysis, examining judicial decisions and offering public policy solutions; until the recent emergence of Chicago-style
microeconomics and libertarianism among legal scholars, a predominance of "the serious intellectuals among American legal scholars" aligned their policy recommendations with the political
program of the Progressive-New Deal tradition. See Tushnet, Legal Scholarship in the United
States: An Overview, 50 Moo. L. R.E.v. 804, 805-09 (1987) [hereinafter Tushnet, Legal Scholar·
ship]; Tushnet, Post-Realist Legal Scholarship, 15 J. SocY. PUB. TEACHERS L. 20, 22-23 (1980).
Moreover, such scholarship focused on jurisprudential issues connected to the growth of the
American regulatory-welfare state: "[P]ublic law articles in leading law reviews ••• are the
vehicles for continuing efforts to reconcile the regulatory-welfare state with the rule of law."
Tushnet, Legal Scholarship, supra, at 809.
26. Representative of this body of scholarship was the work of Professors William Crosskey,
Edwin Corwin, and Herbert Wechsler. See, e.g., w. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 17-229 (1953); Corwin, The Schechter Case Landmark, or What?, 13 N.Y.U. L.Q. R.E.v. 151 (1936); Corwin, The Child Labor Decision,
NEW REPUBLIC, July 12, 1922, at 177-79; Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism:
The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 CoLUM.
L. REV. 543 (1954).
27. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 769-80 (2d ed. 1988); L. TRIBE, CONSTI·
TUTIONAL CHOICES 9-28 (1985).
28. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
29. Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71
Nw. U. L. REV. 417 (1977).
30. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Constitutional
Analysis, 51 u. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984).
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mon enterprise. These liberal scholars strove to create a coherent theoretical basis for the expansive review power of the federal courts.
Similarly, liberal legal scholarship in a more doctrinal mode concentrated largely on individual rights issues and provided analyses to
justify the federal judiciary's controversial progressive rulings. Examples are legion: Anthony Amsterdam's article on unconstitutional
overbreadth; 31 Charles Black's article on state action and equal protection law; 32 Thomas Emerson's book and articles on first amendment
theory; 33 Ruth Bader Ginsburg's article on gender discrimination; 34
Gerald Gunther's article on equal protection law; 35 Yale Kamisar's
articles on police interrogation; 36 Frank Michelman's articles on takings and just compensation and on wealth discrimination; 37 Charles
Reich's article on the "new property;" 38 and Joseph Tussman's and
Jacobus tenBroek's article on the origins of equal protection. 39 These
are among the most widely read and influential works of liberal constitutional scholarship over the past forty years. 40
This sampling of the "cla8sics of legal scholarship"41 highlights the
trends in contemporary liberal constitutional scholarship. These two
prototypes - meta-theories of constitutional interpretation and issuefocused doctrinalism - have dominated liberal scholarship and, dur31. Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
67 (1960).
32. Black, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term - Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection,
and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REv. 69 (1967).
33. E.g., EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1971); Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J, 877 (1963).
34. Ginsburg, Gender in the Supreme Court: The 1973 and 1974 Terms, 1975 SUP. Cr. REv.
1.
35. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term -Foreword: In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on
a Changing Court: A Mode/fora Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972).
36. Y, KAMISAR, POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 1-76 (1980) (reprinting several essays on the law of confessions published between 1963 and 1966). Of course, Professor
Wayne LaFave's early contributions on fourth amendment law should not be overlooked. See,
e.g., W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY (1965);
LaFave, ''Street Encounters" and the Constitution: Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH.
L. REv. 40 (1968) [hereinafter LaFave, Street Encounters].
37. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term - Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969); Michelman, Property, Utility,
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of ''Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165 (1967).
38. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
39. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341 (1949).
40. These pieces figure prominently in the list by rank-order of the most-cited articles published in American law journals from 1947 to 1985. See Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review
Articles, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 1540 (1985).
41. This characterization is attributed to Professor Shapiro, who describes the purpose of his
catalogue of most-cited law review articles as "draw[ing) attention to writings that, by virtue of
their objectively measured impact, deserve to be called classics oflegal scholarship." Id. at 1540.
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ing the earlier period of liberal courts, endured criticism.42 If the Reagan appointments to the federal courts herald the beginning of a more
conservative court era, what will happen to liberal legal scholarship?
Is it realistic to believe that the established prototypes can continue to
be politically effective? And, in the absence of judicial endorsement,
can they maintain intellectual power?

II.

FRAMING THE AGENDA: THE EMERGENCE
OF REACTIVE SCHOLARSHIP 4 3

With the advent of a more conservative judicial era, liberal legal
scholarship that is directed to the federal courts may no longer be feasible. The first stage of such scholarship in this era is likely to be reactive in character. This suggests two issues: Beyond its loss of
dominance in the federal judiciary, how did legal liberalism find itself
on the defensive? And, what are the problems with reactive
scholarship?
The power to define issues entails the power to structure results.
This explains, in part, the functional and normative success enjoyed by
liberal public law thinkers over the past four decades. But, by midpoint in this decade, constitutional conservatism assumed a say in
legal discourse that was both new and decisive. The presence of this
new constitutional conservatism has redefined, to a significant. extent,
the contemporary constitutional debate, allowing conservatives to define the issues and ultimately to control the results.
Whatever else history may make of former Attorney General Edwin Meese's various broadsides44 against the liberal constitutional
42. Both prototypes can be, and have been, criticized for irrelevance: doctrinalism is often
too narrow and contextualized, and meta-theory too universal and abstract, to be meaningful for
living study and practice of constitutional law. See Part IV.C infra. The irrelevance of current
constitutional law scholarship has occasionally been noticed by liberal scholars themselves. For
example, Professor Tribe has asserted that "(m]uch of what constitutional scholars write these
days either focuses so closely on constitutional doctrine, or looks to matters so distant from
doctrine, as to bear no real resemblance to doing constitutional law." L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES x (1985) (emphasis in original). A central objective of Tribe's work is to draw
attention to the fact that "constitutional problem solving ... is in less academic vogue nowadays." Id.
43. As we use the phrase, "reactive scholarship" is not self-reliant. That is, its forms,
concepts, and essential vitality derive from the intellectual framework of its opponents.
Moreover, it is not potentially constructive in a visionary sense. Typically, it permits politically
or institutionally powerful adversaries to establish the parameters of debate and to define relevant
issues, and hence merely responds to their arguments within their constructs. In this
commentary, reactive scholarship refers ultimately, though by no means exclusively, to such
work by liberals who are reacting to conservative decisional law with which they disagree.
44. Note that many of the Meese speeches referred to in the following footnote were prepared by, or with the substantial assistance of, members of the conservative Center for Judicial
Studies, who likewise were active in attempts to rally public opinion behind the former Attorney
General's constitutional agenda. See L. CAPLAN, THE TENTH JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 97-98,
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ethic,45 these attacks helped conservatism to find its way back onto the
stage of American constitutionalism. 46 Prior to this time, the philosophical product of only a small handful of conservative legal thinkers,
such as Alexander Bickel, received much attention, and then only at a
safe distance. Edwin Meese and his Justice Department, however,
changed that situation by "polariz[ing] the debate" on individual
rights issues47 to the point where two liberal Supreme Court Justices,
William Brennan and John Paul Stevens, felt the need to offer public
responses48 to the claims and charges made by the legal spokesmen49
of the New Right. Almost overnight, newspapers, periodicals, and academic journals were filled with "Meese-talk" and seemingly endless
liberal responses to it. Throughout it all, the new legal conservatism
both increased its ranks and put liberals in the precarious position of
taking public stands against the interpretative legitimacy of the constitutional text and the framers' intent - this, while publicly deprecating
the need to abide by the legislative will of democratic majorities.
Coupled with the former Attorney General's :flamboyant offensive
was a more subtle, but nevertheless important, conceptual move. Mr.
Meese and his Justice Department had leveled against the liberal legal
establishment one significant argument that had already succeeded. In
the political arena, the idea had been to depict the "rights revolution"
as yet another example of group lobbying for preferential social privi- .
300 n.70. We emphasize this in order to highlight the functional importance of forging bonds
between scholars and those in power, a point we develop further in Part IV.A infra.
45. For a useful and informative account of the Meese constitutional campaign, see id., at
115-34, 302-05. The former Attorney General's attacks included challenges to the doctrine of
Cooper v. Aaron, the incorporation doctrine, the Miranda rule, and establishment clause rulings.
All of this was capped by Mr. Meese's call for a return to the doctrine of "original intent."
46. At least one notable conservative appreciated the philosophically problematic character
of the Meese "original intent" argument. See Jaffa, What Were the "Original Intentions" of the
Framers of the Constitution of the United States?, 10 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 351 (1987); see
also Jaffa, Judge Bork's Mistake, NATL. REV., Mar. 4, 1988, at 38.
47. Late evidence of this stratagem appeared in a newspaper account of an internal memorandum issued by the Justice Department's Director of Public Affairs instructing top departmental officials "to 'polarize the debate' on issues such as drugs, AIDS and capital punishment." In
one section, the memo described "the importance of associating 'the search for truth with protecting public safety,' " and added:
If you're against exclusionary rule reform, or Miranda reform, you're against truth in the
courtroom and you're against public safety. • . . The issues should be defined in these broad
public terms, leaving the technical debates for brief writers and legislators. The purpose is to
put the other side on the defensive.
Marcus, Justice Dept. Memo: "Polarize the Debate," Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1988, at A4, col. 2
(emphasis added).
48. Brennan, Addresses - Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 2 (1985);
Stevens, Addresses - Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 15 (1985).
49. On many important fronts, Meese was joined in these efforts by Solicitor General Charles
Fried, serving on leave from Harvard Law School. In government briefs presented to the
Supreme Court, Mr. Fried echoed ideological themes similar to those advanced by former Attorney General Meese. See L. CAPLAN, supra note 12, at 115-84, 235-54.
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leges. Now, talk of legal rights was equated with "special interest"
lobbying of minorities, women, gays, the poor, and labor. 50 The expectation was that such charges would produce in the legal community results similar to those already obtained in the political world.
Indeed, in the political arena, even noted liberal thinkers such as
Samuel P. Huntington had argued that the Democratic Party's unyielding commitment to these "special interests" had catastrophically
imperiled the liberal cause, as evidenced by the 1984 presidential election.51 In the face of such liberal charges, and given the surface appeal
of such arguments, the "special interests" characterization placed a
powerful rhetorical club in conservative hands. Not surprisingly, such
charges prompted liberal politicians to gravitate more and more towards the right of the philosophical and economic spectrum. 52 It was
this trend in the political arena which constitutional conservatives
hoped to transport into the legal arena. Liberal legal theorists, too, so
the argument ran, must be made to defend their views against charges
of parochialism and self-interest.
The momentum generated by conservatives between 1984 and
1987 reached a new high point with President Reagan's nomination of
Judge Robert Bork to fill the vacancy created by Justice Lewis Powell's retirement. Judge Bork was correctly seen as the leading intellectual spokesman for the new legal conservatism. Hence, when the
Senate rejected the Bork nomination, battered liberalism seemed triumphant in decelerating the new legal conservative agenda. 53 The
Bork defeat may be the greatest liberal constitutional victory between
Ronald Reagan's assumption of office and the election of the next progressive Democratic President. Still, one must be cautious not to attribute undue significance to this victory. While the former Attorney
General and the New Right never succeeded in fully convincing the
Court and the nation of the merits of their constitutional campaign,
they did manage, nevertheless, to change the judicial climate by more
than a few doctrinal degrees. Just as Meese's conservative concept of
"original intent" was dismissed as too extreme, the liberal style of "judicial activism" also came to be seen in a new and more critical light.
50. See Pear, How Civil Rights Came To Be a "Special Interest," N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1988,
§ 4, at 1, col. 3.
51. See Huntington, The Visions ofthe Democratic Party, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1985, at 63,
65-71. This point is discussed further in Part IV.C.2 infra.
52. T. FERGUSON & ]. ROGERS, RIGHT TuRN: THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND
THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN PoLmcs 8 (1986) (tracing the "forces of moderation" in the Democratic party galvanized by the spring of 1985, and led by the Democratic Leadership Council to
promote more conservative Democratic candidates).
53. See Dworkin, From Bork to Kennedy, N.Y. REv. BOOKS, Dec. 17, 1987, at 36, 42.
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However history judges the Reagan Justice Department's constitutional polemics, they may well have been instrumental in creating an
atmosphere in the legal community in which federal appellate judges,
particularly Reagan appointees, move with more reserve in vindicating
rights claims, even legitimate ones. 54
One of the more apparent signs of the constitutional spectrum's
move to the philosophical right was the Senate's characterization of
Judge Anthony Kennedy during his confirmation proceedings. Judge
Kennedy, "one of the most conservative judges on the Ninth Circuit,"
came to be seen as "an honorary liberal" 55 by the Senate which unanimously approved him. Thus, the Bork rejection did not portend any
new wave of enthusiasm for activist judicial liberalism. In an era in
which Anthony Kennedy is viewed as a liberal, liberalism is reduced
to respecting only certain core constitutional rights norms. If Justice
Kennedy is considered to be "'in the mainstream,' similar to Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Associate Justices Antonin Scalia and
Sandra Day O'Connor/' 56 extended applications of rights that come to
be seen as logically compelled are not likely to be embraced. And, so
far as federal judicial review is concerned, constitutional liberalism
will find itself in a holding pattern, largely unable to shape the law in
any significant way.
In response to these developments, there is a danger that liberal
public law scholars will return to reactive scholarship, similar in principle, though far greater in degree, to the scholarship produced in the
early years (1969-1975) of the Burger Court era. 57 Should a more conservative federal judiciary be receptive largely to conservative scholarship, liberal scholars must not limit themselves to reactive scholarship.
Rather, they must evolve a reconstructive view, which introduces a
future agenda both within and outside of the courts.
Admittedly, the value of scholarly dissent is not to be demeaned.
There is and should be a place for such protest, 58 which may help pave
54. For two differing views on this subject, see Fein, Creating a Better Legal Climate; Wash.
Times, July 11, 1988, § 2, at 1, col. l; O'Brien, With P.R. Fanfare, Meese Orchestrates His Own
Exit, L.A. Times, July 10, 1988, § 5, at 3, col. 1.
55. Gallagher, Here Comes the Judge, NATL. REv., Dec. 18, 1987, at 33, 60.
56. Ponce, 7 Endorse Kennedy; Opposition Invisible, Wash. Times, Dec. 22, 1987, at AS, col.
1 (quoting, in part, Arizona Senator Dennis DeConcini).
57. In this regard, consider Professor Leonard Levy's hard-hitting arguments in L. LEVY,
AGAINST THE LAW (1974). In the same vein, consider Dershowitz & Ely, Harris v. New York:
Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80 YALE
L.J. 1198 (1971); Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REv. 293
(1976).
58. In this regard, consider Belz, The Civil War Amendments to the Constitution: The Relevance of Original Intent, 5 CoNST. CoMMENTARY 115 (1988) (possibility of co-opting "original
intent" arguments to advance liberal values). Arguably, a useful strategy for reorienting liberal
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the way for the new analytical framework of which legal liberalism is
now so sorely in need. In general, the problem is that reactive scholarship is not sufficient. In particular, reactive scholarship is likely to be:
(1) conceptually unimaginative; (2) politically and legally ineffective;
(3) incapable of critical self-evaluation; and (4) psychologically
demoralizing.
Reactive scholarship is conceptually unimaginative because it is
bound to the framework of past liberal legal doctrines and theories.
·Alternatively, liberal scholars should recognize the vital need to develop new constructs. For example, they should look for ways to protect fourth amendment privacy values without speaking only in the
language of the exclusionary rule; 59 or, they might try to secure privacy rights and other noneconomic civil liberties without resorting to
the troublesome doctrine of "substantive due process." 60
Moreover, reactive· scholarship may be politically ineffective. Generally, when liberals argue for the extension of FDR/Warren Court
rulings to unforeseen contexts, they are vulnerable to the conservative
criticism that yesterday's formulas cannot be squared with today's realities. Take, for example, the principle established in Douglas v. California 61 that indigent criminal defendants are entitled to
governmentally financed legal assistance in order to guarantee a
chance of success at trial reasonably equivalent to that of a nonindigent defendant. Conventional liberal scholarship would view anything
short of the full battery of procedural protections as violating the
Douglas norm of equality. But uncritical adherence to Douglas ignores relevant political and economic restraints; the provision of the
full battery of procedural protections may be beyond the institutional
and economic capability of the government. Although meaningful
assistance of counsel and related procedures are desirable, by adhering
legal scholarship would entail "poking holes" in the conservative claim to a monopoly on logical
consistency and judicial ·constraint. An excellent example of this approach is found in Redish,
Abstention, Separation ofPowers, and the Limits ofthe Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984).
59. See LaFave, Street Encounters, supra note 36, at 61 (discussing Terry v. Ohio rationale
and the exclusionary rule); see also Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247
(1988).
60. See McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation and
Reburial, 1962 SUP. Cr. REv. 34 (revealing intellectual insecurity of dichotomy between economic and noneconomic rights in "substantive due process doctrine"); cf. Davis, Law, Science,
and History: Reflections upon In the Best Interests of the Child, 86 MICH. L. REv. 1096 (1988).
61. 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (court-appointed counsel on appeal). But see Ross v. Moffitt, 417
U.S. 600 (1974) (undermining Douglas equality principle). For discussions of these cases, see L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 1119 (1978); Kamisar, Poverty, Equality, and Criminal Procedure: From Griffin v. Illinois and Douglas v. California to Ross v. Moffitt, in CoNrnTUTIONAL LAW DESKBOOK 1 (1977).
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uncritically to former doctrine, liberal legal scholars continue to ignore relevant political and socioeconomic restraints. 62
Implicit in these two shortcomings of reactive scholarship is a
third, which merits independent emphasis. Reactive scholarship, by
its nature, does not invite critical self-evaluation, if only because it is
absorbed in defending existent approaches to social justice. Bound to
the present, it cannot contemplate a future where the same objectives
are obtained by different methods. But, unless they reexamine the
weaknesses of liberal legal doctrine and theory, liberal scholars commit themselves to compounding their deficiencies. 63
Finally, reactive scholarship is likely to be psychologically demoralizing. It tends to be interstitial, gradually making its points to fill the
widening gaps created by formidable conservative rulings. As such
precedents become more numerous, there is a corresponding, and demoralizing, sense of a loss of alarm. In such a world, reactive scholarship takes on a Sisyphean character.

III.

THE LESSONS OF HISTORY: BEYOND
REACTIVE SCHOLARSHIP

If liberal public law thinkers direct their efforts primarily to reactive scholarship, they will perpetuate the single-minded focus on the
federal judiciary's development of individual rights. This is the orientation that has characterized liberal legal scholarship in the past four
decades. But the emergence of a more conservative judiciary alone
demands that liberal scholars reorient their efforts away from a frustrating dialogue with the federal bench and toward some, as yet, unidentified new approaches. The liberal defense of constitutional
theories of judicial review and Warren Court doctrine must be supplemented, perhaps reconsidered, by a new agenda. The question is what
should be the goals, the agenda, of liberal legal scholarship.
Fortunately, history provides some guidance on these questions,
the type of guidance which might serve as a paradigm for reconstructing liberal legal thought. In the face of a conservative stranglehold on
national politics from 1876 to 1912, liberal scholars immersed themselves in constitutional politics quite different from today's constitutional scholarship. Liberal scholars then deliberately emphasized the
links among constitutional analysis, the regulatory power of govern62. What may be needed, then, is not a defense or extension of the Douglas doctrine, but a
method to resolve the conundrum of the unequal application of criminal justice. This may have
less to do with selecting doctrine than with reforming the overall system of prosecution so that
the criminal justice system serves both egalitarian goals and socioeconomic reality.
63. See Part IV infra.
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mental institutions, and liberal political platforms. They preached a
functional constitutionalism that would account for change in the nation's socioeconomic conditions. These scholars challenged federal judicial conservatism in ways that ranged far beyond the reactive. In
terms of the nature of their concerns, of the subjects and the audiences
that they addressed, and of the methods that they employed, the character of the progressive and early realist public law scholarship provides valuable lessons for tomorrow's liberal constitutionalist.
Epistemologically, it may appear paradoxical to return to the past
in order to advance in the future. That is, it may seem incongruous to
tap history for new ideas. There is a sense, however, in which the
present may shadow the period of constitutional rulings from 1876 to
1937 in American political and legal thought. As developed in greater
detail, the historical parallels move along at least two tracks. First,
today's conservatives, like their predecessors, have prevailed in most
presidential contests since 1970 and dominate the federal judiciary; today's strongest liberal allies are likely to be found in the federal and
state legislatures and state courts. Second, the progressive and realist
public law scholars demanded a constitutional theory that took account of the socioeconomic consequences of conservative politics; similarly, the next generation of liberal scholars must reform the law to
respond to the socially undesirable side effects of "Reaganomics" and
the political powerlessness that stems from unregulated concentrations
of institutional prerogatives. From this vantage point, cyclical occurrences may justify cyclical stratagems. 64 This is not to suggest that the
specific policies supported by progressive and realist scholars are to be
implemented "jot for jot" once again. Rather, these earlier liberals
followed avenues of scholarship - functional, doctrinal and theoretical - that may be suggestive for contemporary liberals.
The formal coupling of constitutional theory with politics was already evident in the high political discourse of writers in the first half
of the nineteenth century. Constitutional analysis in the early nineteenth century was treated as a subset of a greater political philosophical study, an analysis of the appropriate political structures of
government. 65 By the end of the century, however, constitutional
64. See generally M. LERNER, AMERICA AS A CIVILIZATION 996-97 (2d ed. 1987) ("The
future never returns to the past but incorporates segments of it into its own patterns for its own
purposes, whether evolutionary or revolutionary."); A. SCHLESINGER, THE CYCLES OF AMER!·
CAN HlsTORY (1986).
65. Characteristic of these writings were the works of Francis Lieber, Joseph Story, William
Rawle, and James Wilson. See, e.g., F. LIEBER, ON CIVIL LIBERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT
166 n.1, 213 (Philadelphia 1853); 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 119 (2d ed. Boston 1851); w. RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OFTHB
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 16-17 (Philadelphia 1825); J. WILSON, Commentaries on the Con-
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scholarship emerged, in a rather self-conscious fashion, as an important forum for warring political ideologies. Confronting forty years of
conservative national politics and an increasingly influential conservative law school professoriat, liberal legal scholars contributed significantly to the politicization, understood in its salutary sense, of
constitutionalism.
The year 1876 marked the end of Reconstruction and the beginning of conservative dominance in federal politics, which continued
until the election of Woodrow Wilson in 1912. Accompanying this
dominance in national politics was a period of conservative constitutional rulings in the federal courts. From 1876 to 1937, the Supreme
Court placed narrow strictures on congressional powers in commerce, 66 taxing, 67 and spending; 68 construed broadly the scope of state
economic regulatory powers in the doctrines of economic substantive
due process69 and the "dormant" commerce clause; 70 and stemmed
the growth of administrative agency powers in the "nondelegation
stitution 1787, in SELECTED PoLmCAL EssAYS OF JAMES WILSON 161, 169-70 (R. Adams ed.
1930). In the antebellum period, legal discussions of the constitutional compact aligned themselves with the contemporary sectional political interests. A worthwhile overview of constitutional scholarship in the first half of the nineteenth century is given in Belz, The Constitution in
the Gilded Age: The Beginnings of Constitutional Realism in American Scholarship, 13 AM. J.
LEGAL Hlsr. 110, 111-13 (1969).
66. Representative of the Supreme Court's constrictive commerce clause rulings were United
States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), which imposed serious obstacles to federal regulation of industrial and business monopolies operating in interstate commerce, and Hammer v.
Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (invalidating the federal "child labor" law), a reactionary blow
to national police power objectives through control of interstate commerce.
67. In one of its most criticized decisions in this period, the Supreme Court nullified a two
percent federal tax on incomes over $4,000 in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S.
429, modified, 158 U.S. 601 (1895), which was heralded by political and economic conservatives
as a blow to Populism. This decision was overridden by the sixteenth amendment.
68. In United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), the Supreme Court interpreted the general
welfare clause, U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 8, cl. 1, to prohibit coercive purchases of compliance with
regulations that Congress could not directly command. The decision was effectively overruled by
the Court's later cases upholding the Social Security Act. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619
(1937); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
69. From the time of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), until West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), the Supreme Court invalidated much progressive state and federal legislation which it considered intrusive to private economic transactions. Drawing upon
notions of natural law and implied common law limitations on governmental police power, the
Court frustrated legislative attempts to redistribute economic power and entitlements among
private marketplace actors. See COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 1227-28 (1927); Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 877 (1987).
70. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851), informed Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine during the following eighty years. The Cooley Court upheld the Board's
power to require ships entering its ports to employ local pilots because the regulation dealt with
local, rather than national, subject matter. 53 U.S. (12 How.) at 319. Subsequent Supreme
Court decisions expanded upon the Cooley doctrine to justify further state commerce-regulation
in the "silence" of Congress. See, e.g., Bowman v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 482
(1888).
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doctrine. " 71
These and other doctrines found intellectual and scholarly support
with the development of the modem state university law school in the
1870s and 1880s, in which the political influence of the American public law scholar grew commensurately. 72 Generally, the constitutional
academy and practicing bar gave virtually unqualified support to the
conservative position on political and socioeconomic issues. They advocated the virtues of laissez-faire and social Darwinism and disparaged the interests of the labor union and social reform movements.
Among the prevailing views of the conservative constitutionalists at
the tum of the century, two themes figured centrally. First, they understood the Constitution to be a source of social and political stability
and valued its utility in the preservation of the status quo. By measuring and constraining the political authority of the federal government,
the Constitution guaranteed cautious and methodical social change.
Second, they regarded the Constitution as "formal" law. By judicial
(and scholarly) interpretation, it could be translated into absolute and
categorical rules and principles, which the federal courts would enforce to protect the contract and property rights that individuals enjoyed as a matter of common law. 7 3
In the late 1890s, however, and increasingly in the first decades of
the twentieth century, a significant minority of legal academicians
abandoned post-Reconstruction conservatism and joined the ranks of
liberal political dissent. 74 This distinguished group of scholars furnished the intellectual foundation for the progressive and early realist
71. In Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), and Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), which invalidated two provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933, the Supreme Court tightened its application of the traditional "adequate legislative standards" rule for the doctrine of delegation of congressional powers. The Court's
curtailment of Congress' authority to delegate its expanding economic regulatory powers was
short-lived. Panama Refining and Schechter Poultry remain the only two cases in the nation's
history that have invalidated federal statutes on nondelegation grounds.
72. At the turn of the twentieth century, professors became an independent force within the
legal profession. As Professor Richard Hofstadter describes, "[i]n the movement for broader
conceptions of professional service, for new legal concepts and procedural reforms, for deeper
professional responsibility, for criticism of the courts, the teaching side of the profession now
became important. The teachers became the keepers of the professional conscience and helped
implant a social view of their functions in the young men who graduated from good law schools."
R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 158 (1955).
73. Prominent among the conservative scholars of this era were Thomas M. Cooley and
Christopher Tiedeman, whose work celebrated the stabilizing forces of the American Constitution and its protection of individual common law liberties. See generally T. COOLEY, THE GEN·
ERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (3d ed.
1898); T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (6th ed. 1890); C.
TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1890).
74. For a general account of the gradual alienation of the intellectual and legal professional
classes from the conservative politics of the 1870s and 1880s, see R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 72,
at 148-64 (1955).
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legal movements. 75
Among the earliest liberal critics, a few public law theorists challenged the two dominant themes in conservative constitutionalism.
First, they demeaned the view of the Constitution as a stabilizing force
that would rein in federal regulatory powers. These scholars argued
that the government's construction of its own authority, denoted in
the notion of its "latent powers," effectively enlarged the roles of the
federal governmental branches, particularly when emergency or expediency justified political action. They claimed that the conservative
account of the constitutional document blurred past practices and current realities of the political system. 76 Second, other writers, primarily
legal historians, 77 spurned the concept of the "formal" Constitution.
They emphasized the connection of constitutional law and politics and
promoted an understanding of the Constitution that would examine.
and describe the functioning framework of political machlliery: congressional committee systems, the electoral college, and the political
party organizations. According to one scholar among them, then-Professor Woodrow Wilson, constitutional study must focus upon the actual practices of the Constitution and concern the "real depositaries
and the essential machinery of power."78
75. A list of the most prominent "anti-formalist" legal critics, who rejected the concept of
law as the rule of fixed doctrinal principles, would include Oliver Wendell Holmes and Roscoe
Pound among the progressive writers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; and
Thurman Arnold, Felix Cohen, Walter Wheeler Cook, William 0. Douglas, Jerome Frank, Felix
Frankfurter, James Landis, Max Lerner, Karl Llewellyn, Underhill Moore, Edmund Morgan,
Herman Oliphant, Thomas R. Powell, and Hessel Y ntema among the early realist scholars of the
1920s to 1940s. See R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 72, at 154; L. KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT
YALE 1927-1960, at 4-66 (1986).
During the same period, the attack on formalism as a system of thought was carried on
outside of the legal academy by political and social scientists who advocated "functionalism,'' the
understanding of objects and ideas in terms of their factual contexts and socioeconomic consequences. Notable figures include John R. Commons, Richard T. Ely, Walter Hamilton, E.R.A.
Seligman, and Thorstein Veblen in economics; Charles A. Beard, Arthur F. Bentley, Frank
Goodnow, Charles Merriam, and J. Allen Smith in history and political science; C.H. Cooley,
E.A. Ross, Albion Small, and Lester Ward in sociology; and James R. Angell and John Dewey in
philosophy and psychology. R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 72, at 154; L. KALMAN, supra, at 1417.
76. See, e.g., 1 H. VON HOLST, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND PoLmCAL HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES (1892); H. FORD, THE RISE AND GROWfH OF AMERICAN POLITICS: A
SKETCH OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1898), discussed in Belz, Beginnings, supra note
65, at 117-19.
77. The writings of the reformer Simon Sterne and legal historians J. Franklin Jameson and
Henry J. Ford were seminal in infusing constitutional study with an understanding of the conditions and workings of American political institutions. See EssAYS IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (J. Jameson ed. 1889); H. FORD, THE RISE AND GROWTH OF
AMERICAN POLITICS: A SKETCH OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT (1898), discussed in
Belz, Beginnings, supra note 65, at 120-23; s. STERNE, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY AND POLIT·
ICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1882).
78. W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 30
(1956).
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Nevertheless, by the tum of the century, conservative federal judicial supremacy had become well-entrenched. With the leading members of the bar advocating the interests of the propertied and corporate
classes, the federal judiciary had transformed economic and political
arguments against governmental interference with private enterprise
into constitutional limitations. 79 Accordingly, liberal challenges to the
legitimacy of judicial review of congressional and state legislative socioeconomic regulations increasingly preoccupied liberal legal commentary. Criticism of the excesses in federal judicial authority, which
usurped the power of popularly elected legislatures, became one of the
central causes of the early realist public law scholars. 80
The link between constitutionalism and liberal democratic politics
was solidified by legal realism in the first decades of the twentieth century. In effect, the legal realists advanced the assault on the two dominant themes in conservative constitutionalism that the earlier
progressive scholars had initiated. Regarding the first theme, for the
realist critic, the Constitution was not prescriptive; it could not serve
to limit the regulatory purposes or means for federal legislative and
executive power. Rather, the Constitution was primarily descriptive;
it established and arranged the channels in which governmental power
flowed.
79. See generally F. STRONG, SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A DICHOTOMY OF
SENSE AND NONSENSE 95-102 (1986); B. TWISS, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION 130-38
(1942).
80. Important early realist critiques of the politically conservative character of the federal
judiciary include c. BEARD, AN EcoNOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1935); J. SMITH, THE GROWTH AND DECADENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT (1930); J. SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF THE AMERICAN GOVERNMENT {1907).
In Professor J. Alan Smith's view, the fiction of the "reign of law" served "as a mask" for
irresponsible conservative politics wielded by the federal judiciary, which could only be controlled by critical political action. J. SMITH, THE GROWTH AND DECADENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 149. Alluding to the work of these constitutional scholars, V.L.
Parrington commented that the chief contribution of the progressive and early realist movement
to American political thought was "its discovery of the essentially undemocratic nature of the
federal constitution." R. HOFSTADTER, supra note 72, at 200-01. Professor Morton Horwitz
describes the program of the progressive and early realist scholars as an effort to "delegitimate
the anti-redistributionist picture of the neutral state" by exposing the substantive premises underlying the existing constitutional law doctrine: freedom of contract sanctioned vastly unequal
market power among bargaining parties; the distinction between public and private realms of
action protected growing cartelization in the private economic realm; and, such disparities in
wealth and power undermined any real opportunity for a vital, effective democracy. See Horwitz, History and Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1825, 1828-29 (1987) [hereinafter Horwitz, History and
Theory]; Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism in American Constitutional Thought, 29 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 57, 61 (1987) [hereinafter Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism].
The two most prominent works of constitutional history that consolidated the achievements
of thirty years of progressive and early realist legal scholarship were L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY (1932), and c. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
(2d ed. 1932) (attacking the "despotism" of an incremental assertion of federal judicial power
that defended a conservative socioeconomic order at the expense of the legitimate authority of
the popularly elected legislative and executive branches).
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The constitutionalism of the realist public law scholars was fundamentally political and sociological. They transcended the orthodox
study of legal texts and traditions; they acknowledged the social realities that shaped legal decisions and the ways in which realities were
shaped, in turn, by legal decisions. The legal historian Herman Belz
describes the intellectual mission of the early twentieth-century constitutional scholars as the exposition of the "constitution as a dynamic
political process:"
[R]ealist critics after 1900 studied the interaction between law and politics with special reference to the forces that motivated constitutional
change. This search ultimately led them to consider the nature and effect of constitutionalism itself. Given their disposition to reform, they
viewed existing constitutional arrangements as the result of men responding to specific political pressures and concrete economic forces,
rather than the necessary outcome of reliance on right principles of political science. . . .
This insertion of social and economic forces into the foreground of
historical analysis was the principal development in constitutional studies during the era of reform. 81

Moreover, for the realist scholar, the Constitution and the common law had importance, not in themselves, but because of the democratic social values and purposes that they enforced. 82 A dominant
argument of the realist critique was the antimajoritarian and incomplete character of constitutional and common law rights. The realists
understood the constitutional and common law systems as instruments of politics, regulatory schemes through which government ordered private economic and social entitlements. 83 The experience of
the Great Depression demonstrated the insufficiency for national economic welfare of the laissez-faire objectives of the common law, which
privileged the existing distribution of market power and wealth. The
realist approach permitted the restructuring of constitutional and
common law doctrines84 so that federal and state socioeconomic reforms during the New Deal might "reshuffi[e] ... the cards, from
81. Belz, The Realist Critique ofConstitutionalism in the Era of Reform, 15 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 288, 293, 295 (1971).
82. The school of legal realism generally understood the common law as a system of governmental intervention to regulate social interests. See, e.g., Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13
CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). This recognition was particularly powerful in the era of economic
substantive due process, in which constitutional restraints on governmental power were shaped
by common law rights. See Sunstein, supra note 69; L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 562-67 {2d ed. 1988).
83. See Cohen, supra note 82; Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive
State, 38 POL. Sc1. Q. 470, 478-81, 493 (1923).
84. For an analysis of the stages in the evolution of federal doctrine that permitted the post1937 expansion of Congress' socioeconomic regulatory powers, see Skover, ''Phoenix Rising" and
Federalism Analysis, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 271, 281-84 (1986).
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which a different distribution of benefits and burdens would result." 85
As to the second conservative theme, realism, at its core, revolted
against the conservative notion of the Constitution as "formal" law.
Constitutional decisionmaking by a priori reasoning was disparaged;
for the realists, decisionmaking required investigation of empirical fact
and evaluative opinion. 86 Instead of articulating the principles of right
and justice that should restrain judicial discretion, constitutional
scholarship should unmask the socioeconomic forces that influenced
lawmaking and encourage the judiciary to take account of the interplay of these forces in rulemaking. 87 From this perspective, the celebrated "Brandeis brief" 88 was a weapon of realist constitutionalism; it
responded to the call for a jurisprudence based less on constitutional
text than on constitutional interests, less on legal principle than on
social consequences of legal action.
The liberal legal scholarship of the progressive and realist eras had
a decisive effect on the more orthodox constitutionalists. Many important proponents of traditional constitutionalism during the progressive
era were sympathetic to the reform positions and critical of the conservative ideology of the federal judiciary. Although ultimately devoted to the regime of objective and rational legal principles, they
recognized that knowledge of the workings of political institutions was
important to sound judicial rulemaking. 89
85. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 437-38 (1987)
(the realist attack on the inadequacies of the common Jaw system of economic rights vindicated
in the collapse of the common law market system during the Great Depression).
86. See, e.g., Bikle, Judicial Determination of Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional
Validity of Legislative Action, 38 HARV. L. REV. 6, 7-8 (1924); Denman, Comment on Trials of
Fact in Constitutional Cases, 21 A.B.A. J. 805 (1935).
87. See, e.g.. F. GOODNOW, POLITICS AND ADMINISTRATION 17-18 (1900) (social reform
requires governmental agencies and courts to understand that application of the Constitution
must take into account changing social conditions); Bigelow, The Extension of Legal Education,
in CENTRALIZATION AND THE LAw 3 (1906) (legal rules and standards are the result of conflicting social forces), discussed in Belz, supra note 81, at 294.
88. Representing the State of Oregon, Louis Brandeis defended the constitutionality of a law
imposing a ceiling on daily work hours for women in Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), in
which he submitted an unconventional briefthat presented empirical and authoritative evidence
from numerous sources to demonstrate the detriment of long working hours on the health and
safety of women. The term, "Brandeis brief," refers to a legal argument that is grounded, not in
traditional doctrinal analysis, but in empirical evidence. On the "Brandeis brief,'' see P.
FREUND, ON UNDERSTANDING THE SUPREME COURT 86-92 (1949); Collins & Friesen, Looking
Back on Muller v. Oregon (pts. 1 & 2), 69 A.B.A. J. 294, 472 (1983); Karst, Legislative Facts in
Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REv. 75.
89. Among the most influential of traditional constitutionalists in this era were Edwin S.
Corwin and Andrew C. McLaughlin, whose writings were quite evidently influenced by the legal
realists of the 1920s and 1930s. See 2 E. CORWIN, ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE JUDICIARY (R.
Loss ed. 1981); A. McLAUGHLIN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTJTUTIONALISM
(1932).
Several of Corwin's essays are instructive in their reflection of the teachings of the legal
progressives and realists. In Constitution v. Constitutional Theory: The Question of the States v.
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During the New Deal and the Warren Court eras, the realist approach lost ground to the call for a more traditional doctrinal defense
of an activist and socially progressive federal judiciary. Although ultimately the movement gave way to the current mode of liberal constitutional jurisprudence, the progressives and realists served a valuable
function in their time. They broke the conservative intellectual barriers to a liberalism that would revitalize constitutional government
with political action. 90 If the lessons of the progressives and realists
are studied carefully, 91 they can serve an equally valuable function in
our time. Such lessons can furnish a framework for answering the
question facing contemporary liberal scholars: If the federal judiciary
will be less responsive to liberal values, about what and to whom
should the liberal direct his or her scholarship?
The example of the progressives and realists suggests that at least
two tasks face liberal legal scholars. First, they need to open a dialogue with liberal political actors. Second, they need to reexamine the
theoretical constructs supporting contemporary liberal legal
the Nation, Corwin recognizes that "[a] full explanation of the growth of American constitutional
law must recognize that the relatively compact universe of constitutional theory is bathed in a
vastly wider atmosphere of social and economic activity, athwart which are constantly blowing
the winds of change, set loose no man knows how." E. CoRWIN, Constitution v. Constitutional
Theory: The Question of the States v. the Nation, in 2 ON THE CONSTITUTION: THE JUDICIARY,
supra, at 190. Consider also Corwin's statement of the function of constitutional review:
[I]n the constitutional field the Court is a legislature; and to the extent that the doctrine of
the finality of its interpretations of the Constitution actually prevails, it is a super-legislature.
... [I]f the Court is to retain its power of judicial review, it must adjlist that power to the
underlying popular character of our political institutions, and hence must adopt a sympathetic attitude toward clearly established contemporary needs and opinion.
E. CORWIN, Standpoint in Constitutional Law, in 2 ON THE CONSfITUTION: THE JUDICIARY,
supra, at 294-95.

90. Professor Belz understands the objective of the constitutional realists, like J. Allen Smith,
Boudin, and Haines, as intrinsically political: they aimed to "energiz[e] the government to make
it responsive to social needs and accountable to the popular will."
Constitutional realists thus hoped to infuse American constitutionalism with a new content
of positive, responsible government. By the start of the 1930s their critique of traditional
constitutionalism helped provide the intellectual framework for the constitution of powers
that the New Deal created.
Belz, supra note 81, at 306.
91. Professor Morton Horwitz incisively observes that, for the past fifty years, constitutional
historians have· characterized the jurisprudential debate between the camp of Progressives and
New Dealers and the early twentieth-century opponents to redistributionist policies as a dispute
over "disembodied institutional ideas of legislative power and judicial restraint, not over law as
the embodiment of substantive visions of the good society." Horwitz suggests that this misimpression accounts in part for the fact that today's prominent conservative legal thinkers "have
returned virtually unchallenged to Lochner Court assumptions": "We have gradually lost touch
with the reasons why the idea of a neutral state was incoherent and depended on unsupportable
background assumptions about the relationships between state and society, public and private
law, freedom and coercion, rights and duties." Horwitz, History and Theory, supra note 80, at
1830.
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thought. 92 These suggestions already point in the direction of some
future avenues for reconstructive criticism. The lessons of yesterday's
liberal theorists encourage tomorrow's liberal thinkers to move beyond
reactive scholarship.93
IV.

FuTURE LIBERAL LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THREE
FOR RECONSTRUCTIVE THOUGHT

A VENUES

A. Functional Scholarship: Focus on Law and Politics

One avenue for reconstructive thought in which liberal public law
scholars might channel their efforts involves the study and promotion
of national and state reform legislation. Given their preoccupation
with federal decisional law bearing on constitutional issues, these
scholars have devoted little attention to the political lawmaking arenas. 94 Unlike an earlier generation of scholars writing within or
outside95 of public law,96 contemporary liberal scholars have not
demonstrated a real confidence in the capacity of legislative bodies to
safeguard civil liberties.
Yet, attention to liberal legal reform scholarship is important and
necessary for at least five reasons. First, reform legislation may offer
liberals the most viable opportunity for affecting the direction of public law. 97 Second, reform legislation scholarship helps to bridge the
92. A similar call has been made to conservative scholars. See, e.g., Mansfield, Pride versus
Interest in American Conservatism Today, 22 GOVT. OPPOSITION 194 (1987).
93. When this commentary was nearly completed, a notable symposium on constitutional
scholarship was published. Some ideas advanced in that symposium's "short responses" bear on
our discussion. See Constitutional Scholarship: What Next?, 5 CONST. COMMENTARY (1988) 17,
28-32 (Tushnet), 38-42 (Hall). 48-50 (Brubaker), 57-61 (O'Brien), 67-68 (Frickey). 73-76
(Bryden).
94. In another work, we offer a "constitutional profile" of a leading national lawmaker. See
Collins & Skover, The Senator and the Constitution: An Interview with Orrin G. Hatch
(forthcoming).
95. See generally Braucher, Federal Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROBS. 100 (1951); Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code - Sales: Should It Be
Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821 (1950); Llewellyn, Why We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10
U. FLA. L. REv. 367 (1957); Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code: An Experiment in
Democracy in Drafting, 36 A.B.A. J. 419 (1950).
96. See, e.g., J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE LAW MAKERS 23-81, 23746 (1950). For a notable, albeit modem, analysis of this general subject, see Eskridge & Frickey,
Legislation Scholarship & Pedagogy in the Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. P1rr. L. REV. 691, 693,
109-10, 716-19, 724-25 (1987); see also Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72
MINN. L. REV. 311, 335-45 (1987).
97. See Hey, Liberalism on Social Issues Again in Vogue on Capitol Hill, Christian Sci. Monitor, June IO, 1988, at 7, col. 1.
For example, over the veto of President Reagan, the Congress recently expanded the reach of
federal civil rights laws to reverse the effects of the Supreme Court's restrictive ruling in Grove
City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555 (1984). By a vote of73 to 24 in the Senate and 292 to 133 in
the House, the Congress passed the Civil Rights Restoration Act, which applies federal antidiscrimination statutes to a private institution in its entirety if any department of the institution
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gap between liberalism and majoritarianism, thus fortifying the link
between liberal law and liberal politics. In this regard, Michael Kinsley of the New Republic has observed, "[g]etting hooked on judicial
policy making is probably the biggest mistake of postwar liberalism. "98 As a corrective, liberal legislative reform scholarship could
provide at the very least a salutary corollary to rights-affirming, antimajoritarian forms of judicial review as well as a healthful antidote
to those forms that run counter to the liberal ideal.
Third, such scholarship is needed to fill the vacuum created by the
mass of individual rights decisional law which has replaced systematic
legislative solutions to a variety of social problems. 99 Fourth, legislative reform scholarship need not characterize an interest sought to be
protected as "fundamental" before arguing that the government is obligated to take some affirmative action. That is, such scholarship is
premised on the notion that individual and group interests can be important even if they do not rise to the level of core constitutional rights
dependent on judicial protection.
Finally, broad reform legislation scholarship is vital if a multitude
of socioeconomic problems such as health care, joblessness, urban development, pollution, and poverty and the criminal justice system are
to be addressed. These interests, important as they are, do not easily
accepts federal aid. Molotsky, House and Senate Vote to Override Reagan on Rights, N.Y. Times,
Mar. 23, 1988, at 1, col. 6.
By way of another example, Congress has sharply restricted pre-hitjng polygraph screening
and random testing by private employers. Karr, Law Limiting Use of Lie Detectors Is Seen
Havirig Widespread Effect, Wall St. J., July 1, 1988, at 19, col. 4; Ban on Most Uses of Polygraph
Tests Clears Congress, Wall St. J., June 10, 1988, at 31, col. 3.
Finally, should the U.S. Supreme Court overrule or retreat from its prior ruling in Runyon v.
Mccrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976), civil rights lobbies certainly would resort to Congress for an
amendment to the post-Civil War civil rights acts that would overturn any such decision. See
Kamen, Liberals Uneasy Over High Court Review of Discrimination Laws. Wash. Post, May 1,
1988, at A4, col. I; see also La Marche, supra note 20, at 14 (rights-affirming bills under consideration in Congress).
98. Kinsley, A Democrats' Guide to Robert Bork, Wall St. J., Jqly 9, 1987, at 29, col. 3. On a
related point, Stuart Taylor Jr. has pointed to the "poigniµit spectacle of 'elected senators ..•
feeling ... pressure to reject a nominee whose philosophy restS on the premise that legislators
should make the laws.'" Id. (omissions in original); see also Lerner, Wrong Champion, Wrong
Enemy, Wrong War, Wash. Times, July 10, 1987, at D5, col. 6 ("the defense of liberal judicial
activism is the wrong banner of judicial semantics for Democrats to follow, whether in 1988 or in
any future year'').
99. See, e.g., Greenhouse, What's a Lawmaker To Do About the Constitution?, N.Y. Times,
June 3, 1988, at B6, col. 3. In commenting on the Congress' consideration of constitutional
questions relating to the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, former Representative Abner Mikva
related that, far from having formed a judgment about the constitutionality of the bill when Q.e
voted for it, he had paid almost no attention to the issue: "That's not the way it ought to be, but
that's the way it almost always is." Id.
Legislative abdication of constitutional responsibility is particularly evident in the area of
criminal justice. State legislatures have virtually abandoned efforts to regulate police conduct,
deferring rather to the Supreme Court to develop the law in this area on an ad hoc basis.
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lend themselves to federal judicial review and constitutional resolution. Such problems represent the "unwelcome side effects" of
America's socioeconomic progress in the twentieth century. 100 Liberal
legal scholars betray the cause of liberalism if they either neglect discussion of such issues or confine their analysis to constitutional discourse dependent on the current status of decisional law.
If it is to be meaningful and effective, however, liberal legal scholarship directed towards substantive and procedural legislative reforms
must establish a context in which its proposals can be realized. This
means that there must be a bridge between liberal legal scholarship
and liberal politics.
The contemporary emphasis on federal judicial review has heightened the tension between liberal legal scholarship and liberal politics;
that is, the tension between the antimajoritarian principles of the former and the majoritarian influences of the latter. This tension should
not exist. Contrary to contemporary wisdom, the Bill of Rights is not,
except for the first amendment, a minoritarian credo. Rather, it protects the interests of the entire citizenry from governmental abuses of
power. This purpose is undermined when liberal legal scholars treat
the Bill of Rights axiomatically as pitting its values against
majoritarian interests. For example, liberals are largely responsible for
the misimpression that the sole constituency protected by the fourth
amendment is the criminally accused. 101 Liberal scholars would do
well to consider the extent to which their characterization of protections against government strikes a responsive chord with the general
public. 102 Unless this is accomplished, the conflict between liberal
politics and the liberal rights enterprise is not likely to be resolved.
Another reason the link between liberal legal scholarship and liberal politics has not been fortified is that contemporary political liber100. Reich, Constitutional Transformation: New Wrongs, New Rights. U.S.F. L. REV. (forth·
coming) (1988). We do not necessarily take issue with Professor Reich's suggestion that, given
contemporary problems associated with industrialization and modernization, the spectrum of
constitutional rights may (and perhaps should) expand in the future. To some extent, particu·
larly in the area of vital health care, new applications of constitutional protection may be war·
ranted (e.g., the fifth and fourteenth amendments' protection of "life"). Nevertheless, we do
maintain that, for a variety of reasons, liberal legal scholars should not focus all or even most of
their attention on judicial constitutional intervention to the exclusion of reform legislation
scholarship.
101. But see Meltzer, supra note 59.
102. For example, individual rights discourse should be prefaced with an inquiry into the
legislative authorization for executive or administrative action. Unless such authorization is
present, the state may be held to have exceeded its law enforcement powers. By demanding a
correspondence between legislative authorization and government action, liberal legal scholars
can better ally their interests in protection of rights with the popular will as defined by the
legislature. See infra note 187.
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alism is intellectually stale. As the pollster Patrick Cadell observed:
"The Democratic Party cannot afford four more years of intellectual
stagnation. . . . It cannot hope to be successful at the national level if
it is unable to restore its primacy as the party of ideas." 103 Although
in the 1984 presidential election liberals crusaded on a platform of
supposedly "new ideas" (as they also have in 1988), "[i]n the end, the
chief architect of the Democratic campaign was again Franklin
Roosevelt. . . . There was, of course, one other dominant figure in
Democratic thinking and campaigning in 1984- the opponent, Ronald Reagan." 104 This paucity of ideas has left liberal political thinkers
in a reactive posture, responding predictably to the agenda set by the
New Right. Thus the problem for these liberal political thinkers was
both their unwillingness to accept innovations which challenged the
FDR policies for implementing traditional liberal values and their inability to forge innovative proposals of their own. Contemporary
political liberalism had grown fat on the thinking of its predecessors,
while conservative Republicans usurped their hegemony as the "party
of ideas." 105
Part II of this commentary demonstrated that a similar pattern is
manifesting itself in the area of public legal scholarship. Here, too,
conservative legal thinkers, ranging from jurists and government officials to academicians, are increasingly setting the public law agenda by
appealing to a new (or newly packaged) code of constitutional ideas.
And here, too, liberal legal theorists have either resorted to the FDR/
Warren Court legal catechism, or else they have assumed a reactive
analytical posture. Caught in a dual struggle to develop their own
sense of direction on the one hand, and to fend off the onslaught of the
"new conservatism" on the other, liberal political thinkers have been
unable to reinforce their ties to the liberal legal community.
If liberalism is to regain a preferred status in American politics and
jurisprudence, its defenders must commit themselves to a change, not
of ideals, but of ideas. Among other things, the establishment of new
liberal "think centers" may be capable of ushering in the kind of intellectual enthusiasm which the Brookings Institution gave to the John103. R. REEVES, THE REAGAN DETOUR 42 (1985) (omission in original).
104. Id. Despite such references to the Democratic Party, the arguments advanced here and
throughout the commentary may apply to all "liberals,'' as we understand the term, regardless of
party affiliation. See note 24 supra.
105. R. REEVES, supra note 103, at 32 (quoting New York Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan).
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son Administration. 106 The legal and political proposals developed in
these new centers need to be conceptually sound, operationally viable,
and rhetorically persuasive. 107 Similarly, there need to be liberal
scholarly associations akin to the influential and conservative Federalist Society, which has linked both students and scholars to government
policymakers and federaljudges. 108 Finally, the liberal legal and political communities are in dire need of periodicals willing to break a new
lance for alternative approaches to societal ills. In the past, such periodicals have offered a vital forum for the exchange and distribution of
ideas and programs in furtherance of liberal values.1o9
B.

Doctrinal Scholarship: Focus on the Development of State Law

A second avenue for reconstructive thought to which liberal legal
scholars may direct their attention is the independent development of
state constitutional and common law. It should be remembered that
decentralization was not an idea invented by the Reagan Administration. At least since 1970, the Burger Court was doing its share to
move American law out of federal courtrooms. This trend was most
apparent in the federal constitutional areas of standing, sovereign immunity, abstention, and habeas corpus. The Court took a similar posture with the governance of its certiorari policy, one decisively
sympathetic to government claims. 110 Likewise, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts, though not reactionary, have tried to put a halt to the
criminal justice revolution championed by the Warren Court. And
there are no signs that this trend will abate.
One of the benefits of judicial decentralization has been the revitalization of state law as an independent source of checking government
106. "Brookings was part of the intellectual base of the 'Great Society.'" R. REEVES, supra
note 103, at 28.
There need to be new liberal counterparts to conservative "think tanks" such as the Heritage
and Free Congress foundations, the Hoover, American Enterprise, and Cato institutes, and the
Center for Judicial Studies. For a discussion of the role played by these organizations, see T.
FERGUSON & J. ROGERS, supra note 24, at 86-88, 104-05, 133, 144, 198 (noting, among other
things, funding sources); R. REEVES, supra note 103, at 23-32.
107. Cf R. REEVES, supra note 103, at 26-27 (describing classifications of political and governmental "ideas" suggested by Professors James Q. Wilson and Robert Reich).
108. See Abramson, Right Place at the Right Time, AM. LAW., June 1986, at 99; see also A
Night with Young Conservatives, N.Y. Times, Aug. 11, 1987, at 16, col. 4 (noting formation of
new young conservative group called the "Third Generation").
109. See R. PELLS, THE LIBERAL MIND IN A CoNSERVATIVE AGE 380-92 (1985); see generally D. SEIDEMAN, THE NEW REPUBLIC: A VOICE OF MODERN LIBERALISM (1986). Already,
some such liberal periodicals are emerging. For examples of these, see New Perspectives Quarterly (discussed in Hendrix, A Place/or Ideas That Won't Fit on Bumper Stickers, L.A. Times,
Dec. 30, 1987, § 5, at 1, col. 5), Tikkun Magazine, and Constitutional Commentary.
110. See, e.g., Welsh, Whose Federalism? - The Burger Court's Treatment of State Civil
Liberties Judgments, 10 liAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 819 (1983).
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abuses. As access to the federal courts was thwarted, and as the Court
became less sympathetic toward certain rights claims, state high
courts assumed a more prominent position as harbors for constitutional claimants. During the early period of the state constitutional
law "counter-revolution" (1970-1977), independent reliance on state
law was largely confined to criminal justice cases. Toward the end of
the 1970s, the emphasis on state law also became apparent in privacy
cases and in equality of treatment cases involving issues such as school
financing and gender discrimination. The momentum of the "new judicial federalism" continued on into the 1980s with state high courts
going beyond federal minimums in areas as diverse as abortion funding, access to courts and public for~., zoning, and various forms of
economic liberty. By the close of 1987, state high courts had invoked,
their own constitutional law in some 450 cases in which the relief
granted would have been unavailable under th~ federal Constitution as
interpreted by the Supreme Court. 111 Moreover, the "new judicial
federalism" of the late 1980s, unlike its predecessor, is no longer confined to a handful of Western and Atlantic Coast states. 1 12
Justice William Brennan has referred to the state constitutional
law movement as "the most significant development in American constitutional jurisprudence today." 113 And as evidenced by the more
than 300 law review articles generated on the subject between 1970
and 1986, 114 this development has not gone unnoticed in academia.
Unfortunately, most of the literature, like many of the state cases
themselves, offers more in terms of approval and encouragement than
of analytical insight and innovation. The states were spurred on to
become the depositories of discarded federal rights doctrines as defended by dissenting Supreme Court justices. While not inherently
suspect, this approach must be questioned for at least two reasons.
First, it renders independent reliance on state law vulnerable to the
criticism that its use is ad hoc and result-oriented, and thus unprincipled. This criticism has won, and is likely to continue to win, some
approval not only in the academic literature, but also at the state polling booths. Second, reactive use of state law has typically been premised on arguments advanced within ~he analytical framework of
current federal decisional law. More attention must be devoted to new
111. Trends and figures in the text are based on an update of the data in Collins & Galle,
State Constitutional Law, Natl. L.J., Sept. 29, 1986, at S-9.
112. In 1987 alone, more than twenty different state high courts invoked their own law to go
beyond federal decisional law minimums (study on file with the authors).
113. Brennan, Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law- Foreword, 13 VT.
L. R.Ev. 11 (1988).
114. See note 111 supra.
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conceptualizations in constitutional doctrine. 115
Unquestionably, an even greater number of state courts will take
refuge in local law if the Rehnquist Court continues its move to the
right. This movement can be expected to continue into the next decade.116 But the revitalization of state law can only be fully actualized
if, at the outset, liberal legal thinkers develop new state law constructs
of freedom of expression, equality of treatment, and procedural and
substantive forms of fairness. Just as scholars such as Anthony Amsterdam, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Gerald Gunther, and Charles Reich
once presented the federal courts with innovative conceptions of fundamental fairness, such efforts must now be directed to the state
courts. That it is possible to erect new, "ground-up" theories of constitutionalism is apparent from the exciting experiment presently being
conducted in Oregon where new approaches to issues ranging from
free speech to criminal justice are emerging. 117 Such theories need not
be state-specific. Rather, models of state-law-based arguments should
be fashioned which are widely adaptable to the texts of state bills and
declarations of rights.
Innovative state law arguments, however, depend significantly
upon reform in the law schools' constitutional law curricula. Incredibly, most of the nation's law schools continue to ignore the burgeoning
developments in state constitutional law and individual rights. This
may be less surprising if it is understood that today's casebook authors
are, by and large, Warren Court proteges. The federal law bias in current constitutional law texts not only fosters a distorted view of American constitutionalism, but also reinforces litigation habits
characteristic of an earlier era confronted by different problems. State
115. The arguments that we advance in Part IV.C are applicable to the state constitutional
law enterprise. Unless state law development is mindful of the inherent intellectual and practical
problems associated with individual rights consciousness, it will fall victim to the same critiques.
116. Ultimately, the state law movement fortifies federalism on both sides of the divide: it
aims for strong protection of liberal normative values on the national, as well as the state, levels.
Obviously, state law can never be a substitute for its federal counterpart. This is because the
state law enterprise is vulnerable on at least two fronts. First, it is more susceptible to political
pressures, le., judicial elections and the state constitutional amending process. Second, there
may be pragmatic constraints on the independent development of state law because of the socioeconomic impacts that maverick reforms will engender. See generally Rose-Ackerman, Risk
Taking and Reelection: Does Federalism Promote Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593 (1980);
Wilson, The Politics of Regulation, in THE PoLmCS OF REGULATION 366-70 (J. Wilson ed.
1980).
These arguments notwithstanding, state law is law, and the state law movement is happening.
Liberal scholars cannot afford to remain ostrich-like in the face of a movement that offers the
most hospitable judicial forum in a conservative era for checking governmental abuse.
117. For an informative introduction to recent state constitutional law developments in Oregon, see Buttler, Oregon's Constitutional Renaissance: Federalism Revisited, 13 VT. L. REV. 107
(1988); Schuman, The Right to "Equal Privileges and Immunities:" A State's Version of "Equal
Protection," 13 VT. L. R.Ev. 221 (1988). See also note 187 infra.
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judges are not apt to resolve state law claims if the latter are either not
raised or are presented in an abbreviated or supplemental fashion.
Yet, that is exactly how today's law schools are training students to
proceed. 118 Future educators need to liberate the bench and bar from
the contemporary mindset that the vindication of rights claims is exclusively the domain of federal constitutional law. We have produced
a generation disposed to federal constitutional combat to the exclusion
of all else.
Along with the neglect of state constitutional law, liberal public
law scholars have slighted opportunities for exploring state statutory
law issues. Basic state statutory construction questions are regularly
set aside when cast in the shadow of a constitutional question. Thus,
for example, when the state seeks to abridge speech, it is all too readily
assumed that the statute under which it is proceeding authorizes it to
do what it claims. Eager to discuss the larger federal constitutional
issues, scholars (and lawyers) too easily dismiss federal or state statutory points. If lawyers are conceding the issue, it is in large measure
because their professors are unknowingly directing them to do so by
failing to emphasize the critical relationship between statutory law and
individual rights claims. In this regard, far too little attention is given
to the fact that Judge Learned Hand's 1917 Masses opinion, 119 for example, was first and foremost an exegesis of statutory law, much more
so than of first amendment law. Just as state constitutional law issues
are starting to be seen as antecedent to federal law claims, so must
state and federal statutory questions be assigned an antecedent status
in individual rights cases. In legal academia, the literature on statutory construction is left primarily to commercial law scholars. Consequently, the bench and the bar receive little or no aid, or even
encouragement, from liberal scholars suggesting ways to reconcile
constitutional claims of right with statutory law. 120
118. See Collins, Galle & Kincaid, State High Courts, State Constitutions and Individual
Rights Litigation Since 1980: A Judicial Survey, 13 HAsrlNGS CONSI'. L.Q. 599, 616-19 (1986).
Much the same holds true for the "pedagogy of legisprudence." See Eskridge & Frickey, supra
note 96, at 726-27.
119. Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y.) (L. Hand, J.), revd., 246 F. 24
(2d Cir. 1917).
120. Consistent with the preceding section, liberal legal scholars need to construct conceptual platforms for viable state constitutional amendments and statutory reforms. See, e.g., Collins, Reliance on State Law: Protecting the Rights of People with Mental Disabilities, 13 VT. L.
REV. 305 (1988). It is too easily forgotten that the Brandeis progressive tradition was built on
such positive law innovations, which subsequently had to be defended in conservative courts. See
generally M. UROFSKY, Louts D. BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE TRADmON (1981).
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C. Normative Scholarship: Focus on Individual
Rights Consciousness

A third avenue for reconstructive scholarship entails the reexamination of the contemporary liberal legal emphasis on "individual
rights consciousness." Such a reexamination is necessary in order to
answer telling criticisms which have been leveled against liberal rights
theory. Ultimately, this self-evaluation revitalizes. It enables liberals
to abandon concepts whose intellectual and political force is depleted.
Concomitantly, it empowers them to embrace a "new consciousness."
We begin this section with comments introducing two major categories of assaults on legal liberalism. These categories are then examined in tum. First, various problems of intellectual bankruptcy,
involving both normative premises and methodology, are discussed.
Second, several problems of political infeasibility are identified.
Against this backdrop, we sketch a few ideas which we believe integral
to the evolution of a new consciousness.
Liberal legal scholarship has become a captive of "individual rights
consciousness." With few exceptions, the most influential works of
liberal constitutional scholarship in the past forty years have addressed individual rights jurisprudence. 121 Since the tum of the century, leading constitutional law school texts have concentrated ever
more heavily on individual rights issues. 122
The current conservative profile of the federal courts may threaten
the liberal individual rights movement. Even if this profile should
change, the contemporary state of individual rights consciousness
portends its own demise. As will become evident, little of liberal theory has been spared assault. Legal liberalism is under attack by the
121. See generally R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); D. RICHARDS, THE MORAL CRITI·
CISM OF LAW (1977); L. TRIBE, CoNSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 165-266 (1985); Karst, The
Supreme Court, 1976 Term - Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
91 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1977); Perry, Substantive Due Process Revisited: Reflections on (and Beyond) Recent Cases, 71 Nw. U. L. REv. 417 (1977); Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
It is interesting to note that 21 of the 25 most-cited constitutional law articles in American
law journals published from 1947 to 1985 are dedicated to individual rights issues. See Shapiro,
supra note 40, at 1549-51.
122. In this regard, a comparison of the percentage of the text devoted to individual rights
issues in the first and latest editions of a classic law school casebook in federal constitutional
studies is illuminating. The first edition of N. DOWLING, CASES ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1937) dedicated 384 pages of 1153 total pages, or 33% of the text, to individual
rights doctrine, including state action, equal protection, economic substantive due process, procedural due process (excluding regulatory due process), privileges and immunities, first amendment, taking and criminal procedural topics. G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (11th ed.
1985) dedicated 1126 pages of 1633 total pages, or 69% of the text (excluding materials in the
current Supplement), to the same subjects, with the notable exclusion of criminal procedure.
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more radical left 123 as well as the conservative right. 124 Their indictments are not to be taken lightly; and yet, there have been few attempts among liberal scholars to meet the charges head on. 125 The
embattled posture of liberal theory offers a challenge: will the liberal
scholar evaluate, in a serious and intellectually honest fashion, the failures of individual rights jurisprudence, in order to reform the liberal
normative program?
1.

Charges of Intellectual Bankruptcy

a. The inadequacy of normative premises. Europe's Enlightenment philosophers established the intellectual constructs that support
current liberal legal theory. The political and moral philosophy of
Thomas Hobbes, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, and John Locke
presented the individual as a free, rational, and autonomous agent who
was both the source of political authority and the ultimate justification
for its exercise. 126 Grounded in this concept of the individual, liberal
123. Overly broad and unsubtle as the characterization may be, it appears that a primary
objective for the adherents of Critical Legal Studies is the exposure of the "recurring, deep, and
intractable contradictions" of liberal normative theory in constitutional scholarship, in order to
"delegitimate" its intellectual force as a legal ideology. See Freeman, Truth and Mystification in
Legal Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1229, 1229-30 (1981). For classic examples of "debunking" of
the liberal normative scholarship, see, for example, M. KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRmCAL LEGAL
STUDIES 62-79, 275-76, 289-90 (1987); Gabel, Reification in Legal Reasoning, 3 RESEARCH IN
LAW AND SOCIOLOGY 25 (S. Spitzer ed. 1980); Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 205 (1979); Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEXAS L. REV. 1363
(1984).
124. For an account of the "growing influence" of a "philosophic conservatism of a special
kind" in our public life, as applied to constitutional Jaw, see Bluhm, Liberalism as the Aggregation of Individual Preferences: Problems of Coherence and Rationality in Social Choice, in THE
CRISIS OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 269 (K. Deutsch & w. Soffer eds. 1987); Wood, The Fundamentalists & the Constitution, 35 N.Y. REv. BooKS, Feb. 18, 1988, at 33 (describing and critiquing the constitutional contributions of "Straussians"); see also THE JUDGES' WAR (P. McGuigan
& J. O'Connell eds. 1987); G. McDOWELL, CURBING THE COURTS (1988); PORNOGRAPHY:
SOLUTIONS THROUGH LAW (C. Clancy ed. 1985); STILL THE LAW OF THE LAND? (J. McNamara & L. Roche eds. 1987); The Crisis in Legal Theory and the Revival of Classical Jurisprudence, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 281 (1988) (articles based upon the proceedings of the Sixth Annual
Symposium of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies).
125. Dean Paul Brest's article, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981), may be the closest
example to the contrary: an arguably liberal-leaning constitutionalist admitting doubt about the
defensibility of fundamental rights jurisprudence. Although the piece may be criticized for its
inconclusive posture, as a depicted act of liberal ideological self-analysis it is noteworthy and
refreshing.
126. See, e.g., T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (A. Waller ed. 1904) (the natural state of man is
independent and self-interested, and government is the creation of individuals to further their
personal security and self-interests); D. HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE (L. SelbyBigge ed. 1888) (the authority of principles of justice and of government rests on their utility for
collaboration among individuals); I. KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W. Hastie, ed. 1974)
(political obligation is a subspecies of moral obligation, the source of moral authority deriving
from principled reasoning by autonomous individuals); J. LoCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL
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legal theory holds that government and law are the products of rational and self-interested action by individuals, and that the preservation of conditions for the realization of individual self-interest is the
primary reason for their creation. The "rights-based" theories of legal
liberalism place, at their center, concern for individual value preference and liberty of individual action.
Alexis de Tocqueville was an early critic of the "social atomism"127 that is embodied in the American liberal legal tradition. He
observed that human relations on an individualist, contractarian basis
encouraged each citizen to regard himself or herself in isolation, to
take care of personal self-interest, and to leave society to look after
itself. 128 Two centuries later, individual rights theory is still vulnerable to the charge of social atomism. 129 The charge holds that the autonomous and free individual is a useless myth; it is questionable
whether the model of independent and self-regarding action can be
squared with socioeconomic realities and the bureaucratic state. Further, a rights-based theory may endanger liberal political values since
it may result in meaningless regulation of human relationships or ineffective remedies for social problems. The following three attacks on
individual rights theory clarify the charge:
(i) Individual rights consciousness places inappropriate and unacceptable burdens on persons who are not in a position of power to
claim their hypothetical rights.
Liberal legal theory promotes the idea that the individual is reGOVERNMENT (J.W. Gough, ed. 1947) (Man is free, equal and independent, and divests himself
of natural liberty to secure enjoyment of his interests.).
127. The term "social atomism" is used by Professor Elizabeth H. Wolgast to refer to the
"fundamental picture" of liberal legal society "as a simple collection of independent, self·moti·
vated units." E. WOLGAST, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTICE 4-5 (1987). Wolgast's important work
examines the relationship of social atomism to the "invocation of individual rights" in American
law, and, in an essay called Wrong Rights, critically analyzes the impact of liberal use of the
"language of rights" on current social and moral conditions. Id. 28-49. Professor Wolgast intro·
duced the term in her earlier book on gender equality to describe the liberal vision of society as
"a collection of individuals, each with his own basic interests and autonomy, even as he lives in
association with others." E. WOLGAST, EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF WOMEN 138-42, 148-56
(1980).
128. 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 477-78 (J. Mayer & M. Lerner eds.
1966). It would be misleading, however, to suggest that because de Tocqueville criticized the
political effects of a philosophy of individualism he did not appreciate the value of a system of
enforceable rights against governmental tyranny. I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra, at 219. Indeed,
de Tocqueville perceived the American system of rights and the freedom it secured to promote
active participation in public affairs and private associations, which would mitigate the destructive excesses of individualism. 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra, at 497-99, 511-13; see Macedo,
Capitalism, Citizenship, and Community (forthcoming in J. Soc. PHIL. & POL. (1989)).
129. In a perceptive essay, Professor Anastaplo shows how a similar atomistic attitude
plagues the "Moral Majority." Anastaplo, Church and State: Explorations, 19 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
61, 168-73 (1987).

October 1988]

Liberal Legal Scholarship

223

sponsible for invoking and pursuing his or her own rights. Rights are
to be claimed. Legal force is marshalled behind the individual with
the variety of means - the political and economic prowess, physical
force, education and understanding, and psychological will - to assert them. The problem, of course, is that legal liberalism presumes
the rights-claimant to be an individual of such means. The rightsclaimant is to be a peer of the injuring party. But parity in power may
not be a realistic assumption in many relationships where society may
nevertheless have an interest in imposing responsibility.
Current constitutional law and liberal legal theory have not
adapted in a positive manner to "changes in the relationships of power
and powerlessness" which lie at the base of contemporary socioeconomic problems. In "an age in which power has flowed ... to government, to large institutions," law might "focus particularly on what
might be called 'middle class law,' the law of people in relationship to
institutions and organizations." 130 To order transactions among social
actors of differing power, the law may have to describe the obligations
and regulate the responsibilities of actors to one another in social relations, rather than merely to furnish the channels for individual assertion of rights.
When individual rights theory governs situations where people are
not in a realistic position to exercise their rights, "the invocation of a
right is often a means of avoiding placing responsibility on someone in
a position of strength and control." 131 "[S]uch a conception of individuals and their rights may not be an effective means of addressing
some injustices." 132 The point is forcefully illustrated by Professor
Elizabeth Wolgast in her example of the "code of patients' rights" instituted by the American Hospital Association:
Now what can be wrong with this way of dealing with patient care?
First, these rights ... imply that hospital personnel are commonly guilty
of unethical or insensitive conduct; otherwise there would be no need to
protect patients against abuse. Second, the institution of rights focuses
on a patient as complainant. ... [But] the patient is not in a good position to exercise such rights .... Giving him rights puts him in the role of
an assertive and able individual, but this role is inconsistent with being
ill.
. . . It's the doctor who needs to be reminded of his charge, and that's
where the focus ought to be, logically - on the doctor and his or her
130. Reich, supra note 100.
131. E. WOLGASf, THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTICE 49 (1987).
132. Id. at 32.

224

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 87:189

responsibility. 133
(ii) Individual rights consciousness is hard-pressed to assign legal
responsibility for unacceptable societal conditions to individuals who
are not personally blameworthy.
Individual rights theory thwarts the capacity of the legal system to
correct generalized societal wrongs. With its grounding in individualism, legal liberalism limits a person's liability for wrongs that are not
that person's own doing. The law is more likely to redress an injury
that is directly attributable to the intentional actions of an identified
party than a harm which cannot be labelled as someone's fault. Unacceptable conditions that are personal to the rights-claimant are more
likely to be recognized as legal injury than wrongful conditions that
exist as generalized social phenomena.
Constitutional law doctrine abounds with examples of such constraints that liberal atomism places on legal liability. For instance, the
narrow concept of "purposeful discrimination," which defines the
scope of duty for state officials under the equal protection clause, ties
state liability for discriminatory treatment to governmental "fault." 134
Also, late developments in the standing doctrine reinforce the liberal
premise that law is to be primarily concerned with the misguided conduct of blameworthy individuals whose actions are outside the social
fabric. 135
The problem here is that the atomistic notions of "fault," "causa133. Id. at 34-35. For another illustration of the failure of individual rights theory to order
social relations in a coherent and meaningful manner, see Minow, We, The Family: Constitu·
tional Rights and American Families, in THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN LIFE 299 (D.
Thelan, ed. 1988) [hereinafter Thelan]. Professor Martha Minow argues persuasively that the
language of rights has proven an "awkward locution for speaking about families:"
Stemming from a tradition of possessive individualism, rights rhetoric in this country tradi·
tionally has referred to the relationship between an autonomous, self-determining, compe·
tent adult individual and the state. Although the family is neither of those two players, the
deployment of rights rhetoric can push the family into either position.
Id. at 319.
134. The current state of constitutional and statutory anti-discrimination law focuses "more
on what particular perpetrators have done or are doing to some victims than ... on the overall
life situation of the victim class." Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through Antidis·
crimination Law: A Critical Review ofSupreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1049, I052-57
(1978); see also Mensch & Freeman, Liberalism's Public/Private Split, TIKKUN MAG., Mar.-Apr.
1988, at 24. For analysis of the restraints that the doctrine of"state action" places on a meaningful enforcement of constitutional equal protection and due process requirements, see Chemerin·
sky, Rethinking State Action, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 503 (1985) (federal constitutional "state
action" doctrine); Skover, The Washington Constitutional "State Action" Doctrine: A Fundamen·
ta/ Right to State Action, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 221, 254-81 (1985) (state constitutional
"state action" doctrine).
135. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). Justice O'Connor's majority opinion
delimited the scope of constitutional harm, first, by confirming that "stigmatic injury" would be
judicially cognizable only to the extent that the claimant was personally subject to discriminatory
treatment, 468 U.S. at 757 n.22; second, by explaining that the function of the "fairly traceable"
component of the standing doctrine was to restrain the judiciary from ordering relief, even if
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tion," and "responsibility" undermine the possibility of achieving
through the legal system those substantive values cherished by the liberal political program. Professor Alan Freeman makes the point
succinctly:
The fault concept gives rise to a complacency about one's own moral
status; it creates a class of "innocents," who do not feel any personal
responsibility for the conditions associated with discrimination, and who
therefore feel great resentment when called upon to bear any burdens in
connection with remedying violations. 136 [A]s a result, the actual conditions of racial powerlessness, poverty, and unemployment can be regarded as no more than conditions - not as racial discrimination.
Those conditions can then be rationalized by treating them as historical
accidents or products of a malevolent fate, or, even worse, by blaming
the victims as inadequate to function in the good society. 137
(iii) Individual rights consciousness presumes that the appropriate legal response to a social problem is the discovery and enforcement
of novel individual rights.
By emphasizing rights, liberalism generates three stubborn theoretical problems. First, pitting individual rights against one another, liberal legal doctrine often places its essential premises in conflict: it may
suffer from "inter-bases conflict." 138 Second, since it professes neutrality to individual preferences and exercises of personal liberties, liberalism may be criticized for striving to escape from value choices.
Third, in the context of judicial action, concerns of comparative institutional incompetence have prevented the courts from articulating
"new rights." We next examine these three problems.
Conflicts in the premises of liberalism arise because legal liberalism
is the standardbearer of equality and democratic majoritarianism at
the same time that it has been dedicated to the sanctity of individual
value preference. Both egalitarianism and majoritarianism are critical
to the liberal enterprise. For example, equality of the vote, unencumbered access to the franchise, and regularity of governmental processes
are at the heart of liberal constitutionalism. Yet, liberalism is dedicated to the sanctity of individual value preferences: for, with majority rule goes minority suppression, which violates the individual's
autonomy. Phrased differently, at its base, legal liberalism is inhereffective in correcting the wrongful conditions suffered by the claimants, unless the institutional
responsibility of the government could be established, 468 U.S. at 753 n.19.
136. Freeman, supra note 134, at 1055.
137. Id. at 1103.
138. "Inter-bases conflict" describes the situation in which a legal premise or position may
appear valid on one legal basis, but may appear invalid on another legal basis. For further description and illustration of the concept, see P. SCHLAG & D. SKOVER, TACTICS OF LEGAL
REASONING 24-26 (1986).
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ently conflicted, as it pits individuality against majority.139
The phenomenon of "inter-bases conflict" in current liberal constitutional law, can be further demonstrated by three examples. First,
the concept of affirmative action co-exists uncomfortably with the liberal legal notion of formal equality of rights in contemporary equal
protection theory. 140 Similarly, governmental restriction of the political speech of some individuals or entities in order to enhance the
speech of others in federal election regulation may be inconsistent with
the liberal legal notion of governmental neutrality in the "marketplace
of ideas." 141 Finally, freedoms of expression and the press protect pornography from social control, while equal regard for the status of women and children and social interest in the regulation of order and
morality argue for constraints on "nonobscene but indecent" presentations of sexual relations.142
The second of these problems is that today's liberals avoid value
choices. Although liberal theory must mediate among fundamentally
conflicting values, it attempts to remain faithful to the maxim that
139. See, e.g., Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781, 826-27 (1983) (social atomism preempts formation of
community values).
140. Current Equal Protection doctrine validates the law that treats all individuals identi·
cally without regard to substantive differences in native attributes and traits, or in social conditions. This formal notion of equality responds to the maxim of liberal egalitarianism: the law
judges no person except by his or her merits. See, e.g., Defunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 320
tl974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Elizabeth Wolgast appreciates the embarrassment to liberal legal theory in affirmative action
programs, which "rest on the factors that distinguish people from one another, while in the
[liberal] model any distinctions of treatment are discriminatory and thus unfair." E. WOLGAST,
THE GRAMMAR OF JUSTICE 39 (1987).
141. When invalidating restrictions on "independent expenditures" for federal electoral can·
didates in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976), the Supreme Court asserted that "the
concept that government may restrict the speech of some ..• in order to enhance the relative
voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment." The Court's invalidation of the
governmental purpose to equalize the relative ability of individuals to influence the outcome of
elections sparked the criticism of many a liberal legal scholar and jurist. See, e.g., Lowenstein,
Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory, and the
First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REv. 505-78 (1982) (the power of some groups to raise enormous
sums of money, without regarq to any breadth or depth of popular feeling, seriously interferes
with the ability of other groups to use the institutions of direct democracy for their intended
purpose); Wright, Money and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to
Political Equality?, 82 COLOM. L. REv. 609 (1982); Wright, Politics and the Constitution: ls
Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1015-19 (1976).
142. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and its progeny, e.g., Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
767 (1977); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), have set parameters for distinguishing por·
nography protected under the first amendment from obscenity that government may regulate or
prohibit. The liberality of the obscenity doctrines has been challenged by a feminist critique
grounded in gender equality. This critique views pornography as a "political practice" of "subordination of women to men." MacK.innon, Not a Moral Issue, 2 YALE L. & POLY. REV. 321,
322-24 (1984); see also A. DWORKIN, PORNOGRAPHY: MEN POSSESSING WOMEN (1981);
MacK.innon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1985);
Note, Anti-Pornography Law's and First Amendment Values, 98 HARV. L. REV. 460, 475 (1984).
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government must tolerate individual and autonomous preferences. Indeed, certain liberal models of adjudication are constructed to avoid
judicial selection of values. They promote decisionmaking by "neutral
principles" 143 or by "process-oriented review." 144 These models reveal
the vulnerability of liberal normative theory to the criticism that it
searches to escape from value choice. 145 Harry Clar argues that when
society consists of a variety of discrete communities of value, entitled
under law to equal social status and acceptance, the rule of neutrality
undermines the power of government "to make of man something
more than a creature of elemental passions and sensations." 146 Liberal
theory cannot refuse to privilege values without opening itself to attack for moral relativism.147
Third, liberalism suffers from the institutional restraints placed on
judges' ability to fashion rights. Because liberalism invokes a right to
correct a wrong, a legal remedy for personal losses or social harms
that are not easily classified among traditional legal injuries may depend on the articulation of "new rights." 148 In this regard, liberalism
may be saddled with institutional inertia, given the character of federal
and state court systems.
The judiciary's prudential concerns over its own competence, visa-vis the political branches of government, to affect important issues of
social policy may prevent it from restructuring entitlements of right.
143. The proposal for adjudication according to "neutral principles" is associated with its
primary spokesman, Professor Herbert Wechsler. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of
Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
1 144. See J. ELY, supra note 28 (theory of "process-perfecting" review).
145. See, e.g., Sandel, Democrats and Community, NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 22, 1988, at 20, 23
("A public life empty of moral meanings and shared ideals does not secure freedom but offers an
open invitation to intolerance.").
146. H. CLOR, 0BSCEN1TY AND PUBLIC MORALITY 242 (1969) (discussing obscenity).
147. The susceptibility of liberal normative theory to an irresponsible and illusory search for
freedom from choice has been attacked, of late, by a strange combination of ideological bedfellows. Professor Allan Bloom of the University of Chicago argues, in essence, that the only
"moral postulate" or "virtue" in American liberal democracy is cultural "relativism," the relinquishment of any absolute virtues or values. A. BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN
MIND 25-26 (1987). To the same effect, Professor Laurence Tribe mercilessly attacks the recent
spate of constitutional discourse among scholars and judges, particularly methods of constitutional interpretation such as intentionalism, representation-reinforcement, and process-oriented
review, for the ultimately incoherent escape from choice. Tribe writes, "The pretense that such
choices may be avoided by some interpretive or analytic magic ... is pervasive. To abandon that
pretense is a beginning of wisdom, if only a small one." L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES
267 (1985); see also Hayden, Our Finest Moment, 4 NEW PERSPECTIVES Q. 20 ("I think Bloom is
absolutely right in drawing attention to ... objectivity [which] masks a moral neutralism.").
148. Professor Charles Reich suggests as much, in arguing that "changes in the relationships
of power and powerlessness" which have characterized the evolution of the modern techno-bureaucratic state have not been followed by the judicial recognition of "new rights" that "can
protect us against the new wrongs and new losses that have come to threaten our society."
Reich, supra note 100.
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Discovery of a legal right involves the judiciary in the allocation of
resources and interests; the more important the social issue, however,
the less likely the discovery of individual rights. Professor Neil
Komesar has explained the legal system's inertia in enforcing fundamental individual rights to basic life necessities as a function of the
judiciary's relative institutional incompetence to arbitrate important
socioeconomic issues:
Why are values such as expression and education arguably more fundamental than housing, food, jobs, and, one might add, peace and war?
The answer may lie in the institutional role served by the concept of
"fundamental rights." ... These subjects are not excluded from the list
of "fundamental values" because they are unimportant. If anything,
they are excluded because they are too important. More exactly, they
are excluded because the relative institutional abilities of the legislative
process vis-a-vis those of the judicial process are thought to favor the
former. 149

b. The inadequacy of methodology. In addition to the assaults
on normative premises, liberal legal theorists must confront the
problems of their methodological preferences. To mediate value conflicts, liberal theory prefers the method of "balancing," the sensitive
sifting and weighing of the circumstances, typically on an ad hoc basis.150 The process of balancing normative values predominates in current constitutional doctrine. Even a perfunctory examination of the
Supreme Court's decisions in the areas of fourteenth amendment state
action and privacy and of first amendment free speech makes this predominance all too apparent.151
149. Komesar, supra note 30, at 438; see also J. ELY, supra note 28, at 59 (systematic bias in
judicial choice of fundamental values in favor of interests of upper-middle professional classes);
infra notes 182-84.
150. Professor Mark Tushnet's overview of public law scholarship over the past sixty years
suggests:
Most legal scholarship in the United States has been captivated by the metaphor of balancing, so much so that balancing is now generally seen as expressing the rule of law. In particular, the dominant view of the Constitution is that its proper interpretation produces
balancing tests in virtually every area of its application.
Tushnet attributes this phenomenon to the "triumph of American Legal Realism" in recasting
the rule oflaw tradition: "Legal Realism was received into legal scholarship in the United States
as a prescription that sensible legal decisions necessarily rested on a sensible balance of competing policies." Tushnet, Legal Scholarship, supra note 25, at 810.
151. The predominance of balancing is evident in the fourteenth amendment "state action"
doctrine. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (open admission that
"[o]nly by sifting facts and weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State
in private conduct be attributed its true significance"). Although less prevalent, balancing is also
present in first amendment doctrine. E.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (state regulation of child pornography); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (state control of
hostile audience); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (state interest in litter prevention).
Balancing is central, as well, to substantive due process doctrine. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (state interests may override woman's privacy rights in second and third trimesters of
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The liberal preference for balancing can be explained, in part, by
pragmatism. A realistic legal system that refuses to hold any principle
absolute and transcendent will depend on the parsing of and the contextualization of principle. 152 Furthermore, the viability of the constitutional regime over time may depend on flexible and efficient
accommodation of governmental exercises of power. This defense of
liberal legal balancing is allied with one pluralist view of American
politics, where results are understood as the amalgamation or compromise of preferences expressed by competing interest groups. 153
Balancing will be undertaken, however, at a certain expense to the
liberal program. The definition and weighing of competing values by
reference to the collective conscience, or to a morality tied to intrinsic
human values, pits individual rights against the force of societal interests.154 The likely results of balancing should be obvious: restraints
on exercises of governmental power are largely understood only after
the fact; and, a right against society is only as strong as the collective
is willing to tolerate. 155 At a minimum, liberals may need to incorporate a greater sense of the necessity for judgment based on a centrality
of values. 156
pregnancy). Balancing is by no means limited to these areas, as is evidenced by its use in the
doctrines of Dormant Commerce Clause, intergovernmental immunity, and procedural due process, among others. The scholarly influence of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Roscoe Pound, Benjamin
Cardozo, and the legal realist school of jurisprudence on the emergence of balancing as the dominant form of constitutional decisionmaking is well traced in Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the
Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 955-58 (1987). Current debate over the methodology of
balancing continues in the first amendment area. Id. at 944 n.4 (list of commentators).
152. The process of balancing accommodates a jurisprudence that is both pragmatic and
instrumentalist, reaching a decision with an eye to the consequences of its ruling. See Leff, The
Leff Dictionary of Law: A Fragment, 94 YALE L.J. 1855, 2123-24 (1985) ("That some such
process [of balancing] must be a part of any practical legal system is undeniable.").
153. Professor Michelman distinguishes the "public-interest" model of politics from the pluralist model, which he calls the "public-choice" model. In his opinion, the "public-choice"
model conforms with the philosophy of legal liberalism, for it reinforces the atomistic premise of
self-realization and self-maximization in the political, economic, and social arenas. Michelman,
Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 148 (1978).
154. The weighing of individual interests against societal concerns can be logically flawed
when there is a combination of values at different levels of abstraction. See P. SCHLAG & D.
·SKOVER, supra note 138, at 39-43 (1986).
155. One prominent liberal theorist has noted the dangers of constitutional balancing to the
liberal enterprise of "rights" protection. See R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 373-99 (1986); R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 193-95 (1977). The likelihood that an individual right
will be sacrificed for the collective interest is anathema to Dworkin's notion of rights as "trumps"
over public policy.
156. Indeed, this point has been made even from a libertarian perspective. Consider S.
Macedo, A Liberal Theory of Virtue, Citizenship, and Community (forthcoming); Macedo, Liberal Virtues, Constitutional Community, 50 REV. PoL. 215, 223 (1988).
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Charges of Political Infeasibility

a. The problem of descriptive irrelevance. Beyond value neutrality, there appears to be no consensus among current individual rights
scholars about the appropriate theory for deciphering fundamental
legal values. For some, the touchstone may be common or conventional morality, 157 whereas it may be meta-constitutional moral philosophy for others. 158 In either case, is liberal legal theory descriptively
relevant? Does it bear any realistic relationship to the ways in which
judges actually function when enforcing legal rights? 159 Is there more
of prescription than description in the scholars' methods?
Ultimately, the charge of descriptive irrelevance is a serious one.
Individual rights theory is not offered to readers as pure political philosophy, to be judged according to the standards of coherence and
consistency applied to that study. Rather, it is likely to be meaningful
to the legal community only if it is descriptively accurate. We return
to this point in our examination of the "linguistic link" for a new
consciousness.
b. The problem of balkanization. Liberalism appears today to
be composed of an amalgam of special interests. On both its political
and academic fronts, liberalism is associated with a number of narrowly focused ideological groups that have not been integrated into a
broad, common perspective. As noted in Part II, political commentators have characterized the Democratic Party as a coalition of "too
many messages," 160 increasingly factionalized by interest groups com157. Representative of conventional morality theorists are Professors Michael Perry and
Harry Wellington. Despite variations on the common theme, both promote constitutional adjudication that enforces values defined by conventional morality. See note 121 supra.
158. Among fundamental rights theorists who depend upon moral reasoning to ascertain
constitutionally protected values, Professors Laurence Tribe, Kenneth Karst, and David Rich·
ards figure prominently. In a most open and candid fashion, Professor Richards grounds his
advocacy of individual rights jurisprudence in moral philosophy: he invokes liberal theory from
Milton and Locke to Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls in ascertaining moral rights that must be
legally enforceable rights. See note 121 supra.
159. For examples; three of the U.S. Supreme Court's celebrated decisions in the area of
constitutional "privacy" challenge the viability of the primary methods in fundamental rights
jurisprudence. It may be difficult to justify Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), or Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) under a system of conventional or consensus morality, as Professor
Wellington, one of its major proponents, makes quite apparent. Wellington, supra note 121, at
296-97, 305-07. On the other hand, the moral theorists generally would find the Court's recent
denial of "privacy" protection to consensual adult homosexual activity in Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186 (1986), a sacrifice of constitutional moral principles. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CON·
STITUTIONAL LAW 1421-35 (2d ed. 1988); Karst, The Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89 YALE
L.J. 624, 682 (1980); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the Constitutional Right to Privacy: A Case
Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30 HAsnNGS L.J. 957 (1979). The
application of the methods of these fundamental rights scholars to the constitutionality of crimi·
nal sodomy laws is discussed in Brest, supra note 125, at 1078-80.
160. In a speech given on November 28, 1984 during a symposium sponsored by the "Coali-
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mitted to "categorical representation." 161 The balkanization of the
liberal political spectrum has been represented as the main cause for
the electoral failures of the Democratic Party since the 1970s. 162
Liberalism is no less factious in the legal academy. Liberal scholars of the current individual rights tradition divide over the fundamental values to be accorded constitutional protection, 163 and stratify into
theoretical schools on the justifications for constitutional review.1 64
Naturally, factionalism dilutes the power of liberalism, both as a political and as an intellectual force. The question that should pique the
liberal legal scholar is whether the normative dilemmas of liberal theory are at all responsible for this balkanization. In fact, it seems likely
that the fragmentation in the liberal political spectrum is, in some sigtion for a Democratic Majority,'' the Democratic governor of Virginia, Charles Robb, claimed
that "[a]t the national level" the Democratic Party had become "a party with too many
messages.••. We are the party of the poor. We are the party of the worker, of the small farmer,
of the urban dweller, of the renter. The list goes on and on." Farrell, Democrats Pore Over the
Results and Discuss Some New Formulas, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1984, at 15, col. 3.
161. Professor Samuel Huntington, a past member of the board of the Coalition for a Democratic Majority, charges the Democratic Party with loss of majority status in national politics, in
part, because "the control of the Democratic Party by the New Deal coalition was challenged by
the rise of new groups that had become politically mobilized during the 1960s." Huntington,
supra note 51, at 65. Professor Huntington claims that, after rising to prominence in the party,
these interest groups imposed "categorical representation:" "the proposition that the interests of
particular groups can be properly represented only by individuals who are themselves members
of those groups, blacks by blacks, women by women, union members by union members." Id. at
67. This, Huntington explains, prevented the "spokesmen" from
understanding and representing the interests of other groups and from attempting to reconcile and integrate differing group interests into a broader perspective. . •. Carried to an
extreme, categorical representation becomes, in a sense, anti-political since it denies the role
of the political leader to extract, refine, and create the res publica that people have in
common.
Id.
162. See note 51 supra; see also T. FERGUSON & J. ROGERS, supra note 24, at 4-11. The
account that Professors Ferguson and Rogers tender of public opinion and of political influence
of business elites ultimately rejects the charge that special interest groups were responsible for
"running the Democratic Party into the ground." Id. at 12-19, 28-29, 33-36, 194-96. However
that may be, the potential for progressive Republicanism is greater to the extent that it does not
have to confront these problems. Moreover, the arguments set out in Part IV.C.3 may be
adapted to progressive Republicanism.
163. See, e.g., note 159 supra (differing treatment to issues of privacy in abortion and sexual
preferences). Normative rifts among liberal scholars are not reserved to the privacy rights area,
as controversies over issues of gender discrimination and affirmative action readily demonstrate.
See Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REv. 713, 730-31 (1985) (discrete and
insular minorities are not likely to require judicial protection); Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 723, 735-36 (1974) (reasons for heightened scrutiny lacking when political majority burdens itself with affirmative action remedies for political
minorities); Karst, Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment - Foreword, 91 HARv.
L. REV. 1, 23 (1977) (heightened scrutiny for gender classification, since immutable and highly
visible trait).
164. See note 121 supra (schools of common consensus, conventional morality, natural
rights, and process-perfecting review). Cf. J. ELY, supra note 28, at 48-55, 63-69 (attacking natural law, neutral principles, common consensus); Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based
Constitutional Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
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nificant sense, related to the prevalence of individual rights consciousness in liberal theory. With its emphasis on individual freedom and
the sanctity of personal preferences, liberalism celebrates the "id." 165
The competitive pursuit of a larger share of the pie, whether economic
wealth, social power or fame, segments the liberal spectrum into discrete interest groups, and accentuates their ideological differences instead of their commonalities. The loss, of course, is the power of unity
and the sense of any belonging. Kenneth Karst characterizes the
problem of liberal balkanization in his poignant observation that
"[t]he community that matters is the cold, often fleeting, community
of the exchange transaction," where "the individual stands alone
before forces beyond his or her control."166
c. The problem of conservative subversion. Although individual
rights analysis became the stronghold of liberal values in the Warren
Court era, the emergence of a notable strand of the new conservatism
in constitutional doctrine also has occurred in the name of protection
of fundamental liberties. 167
There is no intrinsic alliance, of course, between fundamental
rights analysis and liberal political interests. 168 Moreover, there is little reason to believe that the individual rights consciousness promoted
by today's liberal constitutionalists cannot be co-opted bY. tomorrow's
conservative scholars. 169 Liberal theorists who remain wedded to fundamental rights analysis may constantly be threatened with encroachment on their hegemony by the political right.
165. In this regard, consider Freud's classic account of the larger psychological and cultural
implications of maximization of the "id." s. FREUD, BEYOND THE PLEASURE PRINCIPLE
(1920).
166. Karst, Individuality, Community, and Law, in LAW AND THE AMERICAN FUTURE 68,
70.71 (M. Schwartz ed. 1976).
167. See, e.g., note 169 infra.
168. This obvious point is evidenced by the historic roots of legal liberalism in the political
philosophy of John Locke, who emphasized the protection and preservation of individual prop·
erty as one of the primary justifications for government. J. Loc1rn, note 126 supra, at 47.
169. Professor Stephen Macedo demonstrates the point superbly in his recent attack on
"New Right" conservatives, such as Judge Robert Bork, Professors Raoul Berger and Lino
Graglia, and former Attorney General Edwin Meese and Assistant Attorney General William B.
Reynolds. Contrary to the claims of the "New Right," Macedo argues that the Constitution
does not establish a basically majoritarian democracy of broad powers and few minority rights.
Rather, he promotes a liberal, natural rights tradition in constitutional interpretation; the expansive language of the provisions protecting individual liberties in the Bill of Rights supports broad
constitutional review powers of the judiciary. The courts must enforce the values of economic
freedom, private security, property rights and liberty of contract - as well as noneconomic
liberties of procedural and substantive natures - which are well anchored in the constitutional
text. In sum, Macedo advocates a judicial program of "principled activism." S. MACEDO, note
22 supra, at 3-5, 35-37, 50.54, 60.
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Raising a New Consciousness

If legal liberalism cannot withstand the full battery of attacks
against traditional individual rights consciousness, can liberal legal
scholars move beyond the conceptual premises and the language of
individual rights consciousness, while still preserving a certain set of
core liberal values and interests? We think so. But, in order to do
this, liberal legal scholars should consider at least the following.

a. The language of the law ("the linguistic link"). Liberalism
must confront, yet again, 170 the reality that this is a new world where
the old categories and the old intellectual formulas no longer apply, or
only apply in a strained way. "Here, as elsewhere, troublesome old
phrases may have served their era well in the evolution of the law. But
here, as elsewhere, their era is past." 171 In this regard, it is important
to recognize the degree to which legal liberalism has become the victim of its language, encased in the conceptual premises and constraints
of contemporary individual rights terminology: "fundamental rights,"
"individual autonomy," "private v. public realms of action," "free and
unencumbered will," and "compelling state interest." 172 To borrow
from Gabriel Garcia Marquez, "[t]hese are words that have come to
mean very little. They're disconnected; they don't describe the reality
170. See Herzog, As Many as Six Impossible Things Before Breakfast, 15 CALIF. L. REv. 609
(1987) (defending liberalism against criticism of the Critical Legal Studies movement by noting
that liberalism has been remarkably adaptive and that CLS, which reads law politically, fails to
read liberalism politically).
171. Y. KAMISAR, note 36supra, at 25 (footnote omitted) (critiquing due process "voluntariness" formula).
172. In this regard, consider Horwitz, Republicanism and Liberalism, supra note 80, at 74:
All legal systems have a legal architecture that categorizes and classifies legal phenomena.
Every system of legal architecture also incorporates deep into that structure a set of normative premises concerning the proper way to talk about law.
Essentially, we argue that rights discourse is structured by the conceptual premises which it
inherited from the nineteenth-century tradition of liberal legal theory. The potential for rights
discourse to advance the liberal political program in the future may inevitably be constrained by
these intellectual structures. See, e.g., Hartog, The Constitution of Aspiration and "The Rights
That Belong to Us All," in Thelan, note 133 supra, at 362, 367 (''To qse our individualistic Bill of
Rights and fourteenth amendment as sources of language to constitute, recognize, and legitimate
group identities is, at minimum, an odd way to articulate ~ collective faith."); Mensch & Freeman, supra note 23, at 25 ("[T]he language of privatism is a double-edged sword.•.. To have
'private' choice is also to be left alone with it.").
For the opposing view that individual autonomy need not be the precondition for a liberal
system and rhetoric of rights, see, for example, Feinberg, Liberalism, Community, and Tradition,
TIKKUN MAG., May-June 1988, at 40 (liberal ideology need not blind the individual to the social
nature of man); Michelman, Justification (and Justifiability} ofLaw in a Contradictory World, 28
NoMOS 71, 92 (1986) (right as claim grounded in human association); Minow, Interpreting
Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE LJ. 1860, 1874-75, 1877, 1881, 1884-85 (1987)
(rights could be understood to articulate legal consequences for patterns of human and institutional relations). Cf. Hartog, supra, at 358 n.13 (response to Minow); Lasch, A Response to Joel
Feinberg, TIKKUN MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 42 (liberalism's commitment to the regulatory welfare state and social equality conflicts with the liberal philosophy of "live-and-let-live").
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they represent." 173
To illustrate: Ever more systematically, our social realities are ordered and conducted by power elites, i.e., burgeoning governmental
bureaucracy and its private institutional counterparts. While the relationships between the individual and these power elites have changed,
the language of the law that characterizes their relations has remained
static. 174 There are real disparities between current socioeconomic realities and the linguistic framework of the liberal legal system that purports to regulate these realities. 11s
The evolution of a new liberal consciousness depends on the willingness and the ability of liberal scholars to secure, through different
language symbols and different intellectual constructs, the broad spectrum of material, emotional and spiritual values deemed important to
a liberal society. At the very least, this requires a new liberal constitutional language, i.e., a new "linguistic link" to substantive reality.
b. Majoritarianism and constitutional government. In Part IV.A
of our discussion of the future avenues for functional scholarship, we
emphasized that the Bill of Rights is not a minoritarian credo. Therefore, we must ask, why haven't liberal legal scholars viewed and explained the Bill of Rights as a safeguard for majoritarian values and
interests? At bottom, there are two intellectual constraints in contemporary liberal legal consciousness tl}at are responsible for the continued mischaracterization of the Bill of Rights. These constraints point
to opportunities for future liberal scholarship.
First, the premises of liberal rights theory emphasize the individuality, rather than the commonality, of core rights. By moving away
from this individual rights consciousness, liberal scholars can recast
the Bill of Rights as a majoritarian document: the purpose of constitutional guarantees is to secure the interests of the entire citizenry as
against all governmental abuses of power. Succinctly put, "all exer173. Simons, Garcfa Marquez on Love, Plagues and Politics, N.Y. Times, Feb. 21, 1988, § 7
(Book Review), at 24. In the same vein, we examine, in a work-in-progress, the relationship of
communications theory to first amendment jurisprudence to demonstrate that the premises of the
latter are difficult to square with the realities of the former. See Collins & Skover, The Death of
Discourse (forthcoming).
174. One example of linguistic failure is the legal terminology used to address fourth amendment "privacy" and fifth amendment "self-incrimination" issues in the context of governmental
and corporate calls for mandatory drug and AIDS testing for employees. How is.an "expectation of privacy," doctrinally grounded in the sanctity of the home, to be analogized to a corresponding interest in personal waste products? Moreover, how is John Lilbume's testimonial
privilege to be extended to the withholding of_physical evidence of an excretory function?
175. See Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses of the Legal Distinction,
. 40 STAN. L. REv. 929, 961 (1988) ("Increasingly the objects of work •.• consist of servicing
bureaucratically defined objectives, accordingly to bureaucratically sanctioned procedures.").
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cises of power by some over others - even with what passes for the
latter's consent - are and must remain deeply problematic.... [I]n
matters of power, the end of doubt and distrust is the beginning of
tyranny.,, 176
Second, liberal legal theory generally identifies the action of elected
public officials as the political expression of majoritarian will. This
identity of electoral politics and majoritarian values has assumed the
status of an unquestioned article of faith. But, there are sound reasons
for future liberal scholars to question this identity, as the teachings of
public choice theory, 177 the phenomenon oflegislative and agency capture by special interest groups, 178 and evidence of pervasive malfunctioning of representative democratic politics 179 would substantiate.
All this is to say that liberal scholars might examine the nature of the
nexus between majoritarian will and legislative enactments. Liberal
scholars might begin to construct a model of constitutionalism that
reveals the salutary operation of majoritarian will. By changing the
characterization of majoritarian rule, liberals would be free to reunite
constitutionalism with democracy, thereby allowing for the possibility
of broad-based constitutional constituencies. 180
176. L. TRIBE, CoNSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 6, 7 (1985) (emphasis in original).
177. See, e.g.• M. OLSON, THE LOGIC OF CoLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC Goons AND THE
THEORY OF GROUPS 1-3, 53-65, 125-31 (1971) (relatively small groups with concentrated economic interests are more frequently able to mobilize political power than relatively large, latent
groups with dispersed economic interests); Michelman, supra note 153, at 148-50; Wilson, supra
note 116, at 366-70.
178. See, e.g., s. LAZARUS, THE GENTEEL POPULISTS 223 (1974) ("[R]egulation of industry
would have to be regarded as one of the least successful enterprises ever undertaken by American
democracy."); M. MCCANN, TAKING REFORM SERIOUSLY: PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC INTEREST LIBERALISM 39-44, 104-05 (1986); Fellmeth, The Regulatory-Industrial Complex, in WITH
JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN INDICTMENT OF THE LAW BY YOUNG ADVOCATES 244 (B. Wasserstein & M. Green eds. 1971); Komesar, supra note 30, at 415-20.
179. See, e.g., Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review?, 13 CREIGHTON L. REv. 487, 509-10 (1979); Parker, The Past of Constitutional TheoryAnd Its Future, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 223, 240-43 (1981).
Over-representation of a minority in the political process is likely to occur either because
social factors - education, wealth, status - block the access of other constituencies to the political process, or because the "transaction costs" of mobilization on any discrete issue may be too
high for the majority. An excellent example of minority over-representation due to both failures
is provided in Congress' enactment of The Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act
(ANILCA), Pub. L. No. 96-487, 94 Stat. 2374 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 3101-3233
(1982)). Despite the purpose of the Act to preserve nationally significant lands and waters in
their wilderness state, ANILCA permitted quartz mining in an area identified for preservation by
a major corporate concern. At a distance of over 4,000 miles, the costs of lobbying Congress
directly would have been substantial for recreational and subsistence users in the affected area.
Even more important, because the. economic benefits of the exemption were concentrated in the
single corporate concern, it had a tremendously high stake in promoting its interest, vis-a-vis the
environmental benefits that would have been shared generally by the local citizens opposed to the
mining.
180. This recharacterization must, however, be mindful of the "Jonestown" phenomenon.
See Stone, A Response to Mensch & Freeman, TIKKUN MAG., Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 31; see also
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Such reconstitutive scholarship may move along some of the general tracks that we have already identified. Most apropos is the avenue
of functional scholarship, directed toward lawmakers, that proposes
certain legislative and/or administrative reforms. 181 Moreover, constitutional theorists may consider the legitimate role of judicial review
for contexts in which under-representation of the political majority
can be identified in the legislative and/or administrative process.
One area in which liberal scholars might begin to tap the possibilities suggested above is the increasingly important issue of vital health
care. In the scheme of things, it is hard to imagine anything more
fundamental than the preservation of life. Yet, ,this self-evident point
is foreign to constitutional fundamental rights discourse. This neglect
continues in the face of overwhelming evidence of the severity of
America's health care crisis: "Advances in biomedical science, though
welcome, will add to costs and will further strain government and private budgets. We can expect additional pressure to restrict existing
health insurance policies, to increase patient 'cost-sharing,' and to cut
benefits." 182 Even now, the high cost of nursing home care is likely to
impoverish a significant portion of our elderly. 183 It is not beyond tomorrow's liberal scholars to propose innovative solutions of a regulatory, statutory and constitutional order. 184

c. One possibility for liberal discourse: the evolution of new
power-based concepts of constitutional government. If liberal scholars
tum from individual rights consciousness, how will traditional liberal
values - that of anti-discrimination or privacy, for example - be protected? Such protection may have less to do with a focus on individual
rights than it has to do with the acceptable scope of governmental
power as embodied in the majoritarian dictates of the Constitution.
That is, by recognizing more exacting standards on the governmental
Macedo, Liberal Virtues, Constitutional Community, note 156 supra, at 222 (without public
moral standpoint, no internal resistance to communities founded on bigotry and prejudice).
181. By way of a general example, consider Professor Gregory Gelfand's thoughtful article,
Gelfand, Living Will Statutes: The First Decade, 1987 W1s. L. REv. 737.
182. Fein, Toward Adequate Health Care, DISSENT, Winter 1988, at 98. For an excellent
collection of essays on this subject, see HEALTH CARE AND ITS COSTS (C. Schramm ed. 1987).
See also Freudenheim, The Elderly and the Politics of Health Care, N.Y. Times, May 22, 1988,
§ 5, at 5, col. I.
183. Congressman Edward Roybal, chairman of the House Select Committee on Aging, has
reported that "[a] year in a nursing home wipes out the income of over 90 percent of the elderly
living alone." Study Says Nursing Home Costs Impoverish Many, N.Y. Times, Nov. 9, 1987, at
20, col. 2; see also Cody, Lessons from Abroad: Is the U.S. Ready for National Health Insurance?,
Wash. Post, July 7, 1987, (Health Mag.), at 10.
184. In principle, this is akin to the efforts of Louis Brandeis, Felix Frankfurter, Florence
Kelley, and Josephine Goldmark to spawn labor and work safety reforms. See Collins & Friesen,
supra note 88.
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power to administer societal affairs, the interests traditionally labelled
as "rights" will be guarded.18 5
A new "power-based" approach, unlike its nineteenth-century ancestor, 186 might have several advantages. First, without invoking the
language and categorical analysis of earlier constitutional theory, liberal legal scholars might create new constructs suitable to the contours
of the approach. Second, "power-based" theory is more easily reconciled with democratic principles: restraints on governmental administration are imposed in the name of majoritarian limits on power.
Third, it has the potential to broaden the spectrum of socioeconomic
interests that are "fundamental" to the majority, and that must accordingly be secured by affirmative government. 187 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, because it is not grounded in the authority of
social atom.ism, it avoids the analytical pitfalls of individual rights
consciousness. 188
V.

CONCLUSION

Future functional, doctrinal and normative scholarship will depend on the liberal scholar who grasps the extent of the conservative
18S. Although we do not necessarily e_ndorse the analysis and proposals in Professor Cass
Sunstein's recent study of the failures of the national regulatory system established during the
New Deal, we recognize that his discussion of the possibilities for constitutional reformation of
administrative agencies is in the vein of such "power-based" scholarship. See Sunstein, supra
note 8S. Professor Sunstein argues that protection of the liberal socioeconomic entitlements recognized in the New Deal should be maintained in modern public law, but that the problems of
agency capture and factionalism may be checked through a system of coordinated review of an
administrative agency that includes a strong supervisory role for all of the branches of the federal
government. Id. at 4S2-91. For other such examples, consider the proposals for adaptation of
the traditional constitutional concept of "state action" for the functions that may be served by
"power-based" norms in Chemerinsky, supra note 134 (federal constitutional "state action" doctrine) and Skover, supra note 134, at 2S4-81 (state constitutional "state action" doctrine).
186. For a discussion of the constitutional constructs and the categorical approach that dominated nineteenth-century judicial interpretation of federal and state economic regulatory and
police powers, see Skover, supra note 84. For useful historical introductions to the alterations in
concepts of the relative roles of federal and state governments, see A. SCHLESINGER, supra note
21, at 219-SS; Harrison, The "Weakened Spring of Government" Revisited: The Growth of Federal Power in the Late Nineteenth Century, in THE GROWTH OF FEDERAL POWER IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (1983).
187. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn v. Department of Human Resources, 297 Or. S62,
687 P.2d 78S (1984) (agency erred in following directions from Emergency Board rather than its
statutory mandate); LINDE, BUNN, PAFF & CHURCH, LEGISLATIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCESSES 489-98 (2d ed. 1981); Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, SS NEB. L. REV. 197, 23844 (1976).
188. As the historian Arthur M. Schlesinger suggests, if liberal scholars "doubt that such
problems as the decay of infrastructure, the decline of heavy industry, the crisis of the cities, the
growth of the underclass, a generation of young people reared in poverty, unprecedented trade
deficits, the flight of jobs to the Third World, can be safely confided to a deregulated marketplace
dominated by great corporations," they must face the "political demoralization and intellectual
bankruptcy" of traditional individual rights theory and contemporary "interest-group liberalism." A. SCHLESINGER, supra note 21, at 249.
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overhaul of the federal judiciary and the inadequacies of current liberal theory. Moreover, the growing visibility of conservative legal
scholars and their consonance with the federal judiciary and national
politics cannot be disregarded.
Consider, for instance, the expanding prominence of the Chicago
school of law and economics in the realms of federal constitutional
and regulatory law. 189 Consider also the specter of an increasing responsiveness of the federal judiciary to conservative legal scholarship,
with the lead taken by Reagan's recent appointments to the Supreme
Court. 190 Consider, as well, the advent of generations of law students,
who issue from the classrooms of conservative legal scholars to fill the
chambers of conservative federal judges as their law clerks, and to proceed thereafter to the high ranks of federal government, to the offices
of major law firms, and, to further the cycle, back to the classrooms of
nationally recognized law schools. 191 This is not to suggest the inevitability of a conservative capture of the legal profession and professoriat; 192 however, it is critical to appreciate the strength of the new
conservative presence in the legal community.
This appreciation should empower us. Liberal scholars should
seek viable opportunities beyond, though not exclusive of, the federal
courts to affect the directions of public law. They should not underestimate the potential of their scholarship to bolster reform movements.
Neither should liberal scholars decline to formulate a new consciousness that surmounts the challenges to their normative agenda. The
future of liberal legal scholarship is uncertain in the existing conservative court era. The first step to tomorrow's legal liberalism, however,
is today's reality check.
Liberals may view the close of the Reagan era as an occasion for
dancing in the streets. A new liberal presidency may alter the Reagan
judicial legacy or a more moderate administration may not actively
189. See The Constitution as an Economic Document, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. I (1987);
Katzmann, The Attenuation ofAntitrust, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1984, at 23, 25 (the "sharp
challenge, mounted by economists and law professors at the University of Chicago and elsewhere, to the conventional assumptions of antitrust analysis" is the "most important element" in
a "breakdown of consensus" as to "the deleterious effects of economic concentration and the
appropriateness of structural remedies"); note 22 supra (conservative and libertarian scholarship
in constitutional law).
190. See note 17 supra (escalation in trend of conservative constitutional rulings of federal
judges appointed by President Reagan).
191. Abramson, note 108 supra, at 104.
192. In a post-Reagan era, the new American conservative movement may well face its own
"season of frustration, division and discontent." Dionne, High Tide for Conservatives, But Some
Fear What Follows, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1987, at l, col. 1; see also Barnes, Why Can't Conservatives Govern?, AM. SPECTATOR, May 1988, at 14; Fairlie, After the Revolution, NEW REPUBLIC,
May 9, 1988, at 15.
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seek to further that legacy. But such expectations, heavily dependent
on fortune as they are, misunderstand and discount the more lasting
problems confronting liberal legalism, the problems discussed in Part
IV. If in a post-Reagan era liberal legal scholars compound these
problems or even remain oblivious to them, then the cause of enlightened and humane liberalism could suffer in ways never realized by the
conservatism that assailed it in the 1980s.
Liberal legal scholars cannot afford to be Neronian; they should
not fiddle while their Rome burns. If they do, they may only be "excused by two facts: they do not know that they fiddle; and they do not
know that Rome burns."193

193. Adapted from L. STRAUSS, LIBERALISM ANCIENT AND MODERN 223 (1968).

